


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
**SCHOOL OF INTELLIGENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS**

**TRAINING MANUAL NUMBER 5**

**THE OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE**

**A STUDY OF ITS FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION**

**By**



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**OFFICE OF TRAINING**

**MAY 1970**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page No.
FOREWORD.....	iii
GLOSSARY.....	iv
CONCEPT, HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION.....	1
Authorization and Concept.....	1
History.....	3
Organization.....	7
Professionalism in OCI.....	8
PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE.....	10
The Process of Production.....	10
National Intelligence.....	11
Departmental Intelligence.....	18
PRODUCTION SUPPORT ACTIVITIES.....	22
Support for the National Security Council.....	22
Operation of Task Forces.....	22
The Watch and Alerting Function.....	24
Briefing and Liaison Activities.....	26
Participation in Interdepartmental Committees.....	27
PROSPECTS.....	28
SELECTED READINGS.....	30
25X1A [redacted] "Intelligence for the Policy Chiefs".....	31
25X1A [redacted] "On Warning".....	42
25X1A [redacted] "Policy Bias".....	49
25X1A [redacted] "Style and Stereotypes in Intelligence Studies".....	54
25X1A [redacted] "The Monitoring of War Indicators"...	59
25X1A [redacted] "A Watchman for All Seasons".....	72
25X1A [redacted] "Policy and Intelligence: The Arab-Israeli War".....	78
25X1A [redacted] "View from the Hot Shop".....	86
25X1A [redacted] "The Analyst in a War Theater Role"...	93
25X1A [redacted] "Cloud 9: A Problem in Intelligence Production.....	101

25X1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

LIST OF CHARTS

1. The Office of Current Intelligence  
(Organization Chart).....Follows Page 7
2. The CIA Operations Center  
(Organization and Functions Chart).....Follows Page 24

APPENDIXES

- A. Sample Articles from Central Intelligence Bulletin
  1. Brief: "Communist China"
  2. Notes: "UN-Middle East," "Nigeria," "East Germany-Guinea"
- B. Sample Item from National Intelligence Survey  
Introduction, (General Survey): "INDIA"
- C. Sample Items from Weekly Summary
  1. Table of Contents
  2. Preface: "Far East"
  3. Article: "Communist Guerrillas Active in Thailand"
- D. Sample of a Weekly Summary Special Report
- E. Sample OCI Intelligence Memorandum  
"Czechoslovakia Faces the First Anniversary of the Invasion"
- F. Sample OCI Situation Report
  1. "El Salvador - Honduras"
  2. "Countries to be Visited by the President, No. 8"
- G. Sample OCI Briefing Notes  
"CUBA"

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FOREWORD


This manual describes the activities of the Office of Current Intelligence. Five types of publication most likely to be of interest to the reader--the Central Intelligence Bulletin, the National Intelligence Survey, the President's Daily Brief, the Weekly Summary, and the Intelligence Memorandum--are described in some detail. The remainder of the text deals with the concepts and history of OCI, its organization and personnel, some of its special functions (including the watch, indications, and alert functions), and its outlook. In addition, the manual includes reprints of articles from the Studies in Intelligence as well as examples of various OCI publications.

The text is designed primarily for students in the CIA Career Training Program, for new employees, and for those undertaking new duties within the Office of Current Intelligence. The manual may also be useful to other CIA employees involved in collecting intelligence information or reviewing Agency production and to members of the broader Intelligence Community interested in a better understanding of some of CIA's production activities.

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
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
GLOSSARY

All-Source Information	Intelligence information from all sources regardless of classification.
CIB	<u>Central Intelligence Bulletin</u>
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
CRITIC	The communications system for handling intelligence information indicating a situation or pertaining to a situation which affects the security or interests of the U.S. to such an extent that it may require the immediate attention of the President. It is given adequate communications precedence and rapid analytic handling to permit it to reach responsible action officials in Washington within ten minutes of the identification of the intelligence information.
CRS	Central Reference Service
CS	Clandestine Service
DD/I	Deputy Director for Intelligence
DD/P	Deputy Director for Plans
DDS&T	Directorate for Science and Technology
Departmental Intelligence	Finished intelligence which a department or agency requires to execute its own mission.
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
D/OCI	Director of Current Intelligence
STATSPEC	
FMSAC	Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center



STATSPEC

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
IG	Interdepartmental Group
IM	<u>Intelligence Memorandum</u>
INDICO	Indications Officer
INR	Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State)
JANIS	<u>Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies</u>
LDX	Long Distance Xerography
National Intelligence	Finished intelligence required for formulating national security policy which is contributed to, and coordi- nated by, several intelligence organizations.
NIC	National Indications Center
NIE	<u>National Intelligence Estimate</u>
NIS	<u>National Intelligence Survey</u>
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NSSM	<u>National Security Study Memorandum</u>
OBGI	Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence
OCI	Office of Current Intelligence
OER	Office of Economic Research
ONE	Office of National Estimates
ORE	Office of Reports and Estimates
ORR	Office of Research and Reports

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OSR	Office of Strategic Research
PO	Production Officer
SAVA	Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
SDO	Senior Duty Officer
SI	Special Intelligence (COMINT)
SNIE	<u>Special National Intelligence Estimate</u>
USIB	United States Intelligence Board

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## CONCEPT, HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION

A. AUTHORIZATION AND CONCEPT

The Office of Current Intelligence is responsible for providing quick evaluation of world-wide all-source intelligence information twenty-four hours a day to support the Director's role as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer. This role was spelled out in a letter from President Kennedy to John McCone in 1962\*, and again in a memorandum from President Johnson to McCone on 24 September 1964.

It was the Director's need for a close support office that led to OCI's formation in 1951, but the authorization for the functions of the Office of Current Intelligence is found in National Security Council Intelligence Directive #3, of which the current version is dated 18 January 1961. This directive defines current intelligence and assigns to CIA a major responsibility for its production. In section 2 the Directive states:


"Current intelligence is that intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest which is usually disseminated without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation."

"The Central Intelligence Agency and the several departments and agencies shall produce and disseminate such current intelligence as may be necessary to meet their own internal requirements. Normally, the current intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence Agency is produced primarily to meet the needs of the President and National Security Council; in addition it serves the

\* President Kennedy, after appointing John McCone as Director of Central Intelligence on 16 January 1962 wrote, "In carrying out your newly assigned duties as Director of Central Intelligence it is my wish that you serve as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer, and as such that you undertake, as an integral part of your responsibility, the coordination and effective guidance of the total United States foreign intelligence effort.

"As the Government's principal intelligence officer, you will assure the proper coordination, correlation, and evaluation of intelligence for all sources and its prompt dissemination to me and to other recipients."

S E C R E T



common needs of the interested departments and agencies of the Government for current intelligence which they themselves do not produce. The departments and agencies will contribute to the Central Intelligence Agency current intelligence publications as practicable."

Current intelligence requires that all incoming information that might indicate a threat or potential threat to U.S. security--whether political, economic, or military--be recognized immediately and without fail, and that it be processed immediately without waiting on the regular production schedule. The process of evaluating critical intelligence information must take place without the quantity of data and the leisurely analysis available later.

Since the founding of OCI, the all-source principle has been a fundamental consideration in the office's operations. All information, regardless of security classification, is distributed to the analytic desk of primary concern. OCI was the first element of CIA and of the Intelligence Community to adopt this procedure in regard to all-source material.

OCI's current intelligence function may be divided into three main phases. The first is to alert the White House, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Intelligence Community; it is fulfilled largely by the CIA Operations Center--supported by the substantive analyses and judgments of the OCI analysts--and by OCI's regular publications. The second is preparing a draft briefing paper for the Director when he appears before the National Security Council, congressional committees, and other official gatherings. Perhaps best known is the third, as a producer of current intelligence publications--both national and departmental.\*

The volume of OCI reporting has increased greatly in the last decade. Since 1958 the office has produced daily national intelligence in the form of the Central Intelligence Bulletin, which presents the consensus of Intelligence Community evaluation of significant world developments. In addition, OCI produces several important publications that are not coordinated within the Intelligence Community. Chief among these are the President's Daily

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\* National Intelligence is finished intelligence required for formulating national security policy which is contributed to, and coordinated by, several intelligence organizations.

Departmental Intelligence is finished intelligence which a department or agency requires to execute its own mission.

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Brief, with a very restricted readership; the Weekly Summary, with a fairly wide circulation; and specialized memoranda and reports written for the White House Staff and other top government officials.

Along with its function of supplying current intelligence, OCI is increasingly involved in basic research. Since 1962, OCI has been charged with preparing the political, sociological, and subversion sections of the General Survey of the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) for each of the hundred-odd countries covered by this program. More recently, OCI has enlarged its research effort to include in-depth studies of long-range problems, mainly political and sociological, that are likely to have a significant effect on the stability, development, and ideological orientation of important nations. Most of these projects have been self-initiated.

#### B. HISTORY

The Office of Current Intelligence developed out of two organizations in CIA: The COMINT division of the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) and the Advisory Council, which served as the Director's staff for COMINT matters. In December 1950, William Jackson, Deputy Director of CIA, approved the creation of an office to handle all-source current intelligence and to be named the Office of Special Services; in January 1951 it was renamed the Office of Current Intelligence. Production of the CIA daily report previously assigned to the newly formed Office of National Estimates was transferred to OCI, together with responsibility for furnishing current intelligence support to ONE and the Director in making their estimates of the situation. To staff the office, [ ] former ORE employees were added to the [ ] people assigned to the transitional Office of Special Services. Because special security clearances were mandatory for all, and few of the [ ] had such clearances, it was February 1951 before OCI could function as a unit.

OCI's original organization included a Policy and Planning Staff; an Administrative Staff; a Special Information Center (with a Reading Panel); a Watch Office; and a Current Intelligence Division. This last division included an Indications Branch, a Support Branch (divided into geographic areas with emphasis on the Communist world), and a Situation Room Branch to handle graphics and briefings. The ceiling for personnel was set at [ ]

By 1970 OCI has changed considerably and has become recognized both as the alerting office of the Agency and as a quick source of substantive judgments on a wide range of international problems. The Watch Office has become a greatly expanded CIA Operations Center. The Indications Branch has been superseded by an OCI Indications

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Officer (INDICO) who is the contact point with the National Indications Center (NIC) run by the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Intelligence coverage of non-Communist regions has burgeoned, and the simple briefing function of the former Situation Room Branch has been taken over by a specialized staff which adapts the written intelligence contributions of several offices of the Directorate of Intelligence to the style required for oral presentation by top Agency officials.

### Publications

Since the days of its formation, OCI has produced a daily current intelligence report. On 28 February 1951 an all-source Current Intelligence Bulletin made its first official appearance. Each item carried a paraphrase of a field intelligence information report and an analyst's comment on its significance. Originally, dissemination was limited to the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the three service chiefs, but within a few years the list expanded to 13 copies outside CIA. During this period the publication was strictly a departmental product, reflecting only the views of OCI.

In 1958 OCI began the production of a national intelligence publication, the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), after the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities advised the Director of Central Intelligence that the Board was not satisfied that CIA's statutory responsibilities for correlating and evaluating national current intelligence were being met. The authorization for a national coordinated publication was contained in a revision of NSCID #3 on 13 January 1958.

"Normally, the current intelligence produced by the CIA is produced primarily to meet the needs of the President and the NSC; in addition it serves the common needs of the interested Departments and Agencies of the government for current intelligence which they themselves do not produce. The Departments and Agencies will contribute to the CIA current intelligence publications as practicable."

The change to a coordinated publication required the institution of a panel system where representatives of the Departments of State and Defense take an active part in reviewing the Bulletin items. Initial meetings were often stormy, but gradually an atmosphere of trust and cooperation was achieved. Until the formation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1961, each of the three military services was represented.

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In December 1964 there was a major change in the CIB format. The briefs were lengthened to some 250 words and introduced by a one sentence lead paragraph that carried the central theme. Another major change occurred in April 1968 when, to remedy the deficiency of inadequate coverage of sensitive materials, OCI began to publish the Bulletin at three different classifications to meet the specialized needs of different consumers.

Similarly, the present weekly publications grew out of the weeklies written by the Office of Reports and Estimates before the establishment of OCI. Until the late 1950's the weekly was a thick publication printed on legal-size pages, almost too heavy for convenient handling. It was divided into three parts; the first dealt with the world hot spots and was recommended reading for the busy official who could spend only a few minutes on the publication. Part II dealt with subjects of repeated interest to the intelligence specialist; Part III considered items in perspective with considerable background treatment.

By 1966 the weekly assumed its present format. The trend or background articles (former Part III) are published separately as Special Reports, and the regular articles of the four major regional subdivisions are preceded by a one-page "perspective" section which permits the busy reader to see at a glance the significant weekly developments in each area.

Several of OCI's publications and activities date from the early 1960's. Among the most important of OCI's finished intelligence publications are the Intelligence Memoranda (IMs). They were conceived during the administration of President Kennedy to aid White House Staff officials and have been used extensively by those officials and their successors in subsequent administrations. Staff officials are interested in knowing quickly OCI's viewpoint on international developments and, therefore, frequently assign short deadlines--on many occasions a matter of hours. They are also interested in getting background judgments on problems requiring policy decisions and those related to implementation of policy. The IM is particularly challenging to the analyst because he has a highly-placed consumer, and he has relative freedom in style and length to "speak his piece."

#### National Intelligence Survey Program

During this period OCI became increasingly involved in research as the Office's participation in the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) grew larger. The NIS Program was an outgrowth of the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) of World War II days, and it was established to preclude the possibility that the U.S. would ever

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again be confronted with a lack of basic intelligence on foreign areas, as had occurred during most of World War II. The JANIS was heavily military in coverage, featuring maps with minimum text, and was designed primarily for military commanders and planners. The peacetime basic intelligence program was to be wider in scope, with greater attention devoted to political, sociological, and economic matters.


In the late 1940's the Central Intelligence Agency had been given responsibility for coordinating the NIS research program, and other departments of the U.S. Government produced most of the sections. The CIA funded these activities and acted as coordinator for the project. However, a major change occurred in 1961 when Secretary of State Rusk decided that the Department of State--which had produced the political and sociological sections--would discontinue basic research except for that connected with policy decisions. As a result, writing of these sections for the single-volume General Survey for each country became the responsibility of the Office of Current Intelligence. Other offices of the Directorate of Intelligence have responsibilities for other subjects; all the sections of the General Survey prepared in CIA are under the control of the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence.

#### Task Force Concept

Also during the 1960's and particularly as a result of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and its lengthy aftermath which made exceptionally heavy demands on the personnel resources of the Cuban desk, OCI gradually developed a concept of operating an area task force to meet the greatly expanded demands for intelligence analysis and production during a crisis. In this responsibility it has the active support of all offices of the Directorate of Intelligence, the Office of National Estimates, and the Clandestine Service. During the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965 the Director of Central Intelligence became involved in devising task force techniques and facilities. The Kashmir Task Force of the autumn of 1965 was the first to occupy quarters in the Operations Center where it had the advantage of seclusion, superior communications facilities, easy contact with the Center's Watch Officers, and quick access to a representative of the Clandestine Service. From 1964 to 1967, OCI improved the system of task force management. The concept was notably successful with the Arab-Israeli Task Force of June-July 1967, when the daily handling of the situation brought general praise. OCI has also adopted special procedures for functioning during a Presidential trip abroad. Here the security of the President is the primary concern, but there is also special handling of intelligence reporting to the Presidential party.

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ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
Office of the Director



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C. ORGANIZATION

OCI has four geographic divisions for substantive intelligence production and four supporting functional staffs, and manages the CIA Operations Center. The branches within each of the geographic divisions are small, and an analyst usually handles one or more countries and is looked to as the authority on his areas. In the case of the Soviet Union and Communist China, which are handled by one or more branches, an analyst has responsibility for one or more aspects of the country's political and sociological life or international posture.

1. The Four Geographic Divisions:

The European Division handles Western and Eastern Europe, the USSR, and European and Communist international organizations. The Far East Division covers China, Vietnam, Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, and Australia and New Zealand. The Middle East-Africa Division covers Greece, the Middle East and South Asia, and Africa. The Western Hemisphere Division handles all countries south of the United States, and dependent possessions of the European countries in the Western Hemisphere.

2. The Four Staffs:

a. The Production Staff (see chart) is responsible for reviewing, editing, publishing, and disseminating the regular publications and special current intelligence production of OCI. In addition, it prepares all-source current intelligence briefings, provides current intelligence support to overseas stations by cable or pouch, and monitors the contacts and activities within OCI.


Through the News Analysis Officer, the staff is responsible for alerting the Director of Central Intelligence and his principal assistants to important news from the wire service tickers--AP, UPI, Reuters, FBIS--located in the CIA Operations Center and for supplementing this information with relevant data from classified sources. The Indications Officer (INDICO) coordinates Agency support of the strategic warning responsibility of the National Indications Center.

The Staff is responsible in OCI for central document control, for the reproduction of the publications, and for operating a special courier system needed for the sensitive materials.

b. The Research Staff is charged with stimulating research throughout OCI. It has encouraged office studies, as well as joint research projects with other components of the Agency, with other Government departments, and with academic centers and research institutes. The



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Research Staff plans and coordinates OCI's responsibilities under the National Intelligence Survey program. In addition, the Staff monitors the research and writing of OCI's history.

c. The Special Projects Staff provides substantive intelligence support and planning that cut across the responsibilities of the geographic divisions, including preparation and delivery of the President's Daily Brief and any required oral supplement to the written analysis.

d. The Management Staff administers OCI's personnel, budget, travel, training, logistics, and records. The Staff includes the Career Development Officer and the Plans and Technology Officer, who is concerned with OCI's projected needs and role in the next decade.

### 3. The CIA Operations Center:

The Center, administered by the Director of Current Intelligence as the agent of the DD/I, is charged with providing a 24-hour intelligence alert facility. The Center is responsible for alerting the White House, the Director of Central Intelligence, DD/I, DD/P, and other senior Agency officials to situations and developments requiring their immediate attention. It also watches developments requiring priority intelligence information collection, and it operates a Situation Room for the display of U.S. and friendly military operations and critical intelligence situations. In addition, the Center is geared to ensure the rapid movement of all incoming intelligence information and its prompt evaluation, and to maintain close liaison with corresponding watch centers in other parts of CIA and in other agencies. Other duties include producing finished intelligence during off-duty hours, with the assistance of appropriate OCI substantive elements; facilitating the work of ad hoc intelligence task forces; operating and controlling the CIA terminal of the Washington area high-speed facsimile Long Distance Xerography (LDX) network; providing facilities for the Clandestine Service Duty officer; and providing daily support to the Directorate of Intelligence representatives abroad.

### D. PROFESSIONALISM IN OCI

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As of May 1970, OCI had an authorized strength of  persons, of whom  were professionals and  were secretarial and clerical. The vast majority serve at Headquarters, although sixteen were on PCS duty at several overseas posts and lesser numbers were in rotational assignments with the Clandestine Service and other Agency components or were attending institutions of higher learning.

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Many OCI employees have been hired directly from the academic, professional, and business communities. OCI has also relied heavily on the Career Training Program, and in May 1970 some 30 percent of the professionals on duty were products of that program. The Office has also drawn on the Agency's Skills Bank and utilized veterans of OSS days. Some 32 percent of its professionals have been with the Office for ten years or more.

Among the professionals there is a high level of academic achievement; only a small percentage does not have at least one college degree. Some 45 percent have Master's Degrees, and 9 percent are Doctors of Philosophy--many of these have MA's as well. The majority of all degrees are in the social sciences, particularly political science and history. In addition, many analysts have personal backgrounds of value to the Office as a result of residence abroad and a knowledge of foreign languages.

The professional in OCI can increase his knowledge and expertise both through a daily exposure to varied sources of information and through programs of travel and academic training. Since early in the 1950's, OCI has carried out an Area Familiarization Trip Program in which the analyst can visit his area of interest, if it is not a denied area, on a government-sponsored trip. OCI also sponsors employees for university courses related to the employees work, and a number of employees have been able to use credits so obtained to satisfy the requirements for advanced degrees. Some professionals are sent to special study programs, such as the China Area Studies now being featured at both Harvard and California; others attend the senior service schools, such as the Naval War College.

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## PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE

### A. THE PROCESS OF PRODUCTION

OCI strives for clear, non-emotional, easy-to-understand writing which the busy Government official can quickly grasp. There is no mystique to this writing process, and any OCI analyst who thinks clearly usually has a minimum of difficulties with editors. Basic to the production process, of course, is the analysis of the situation by the trained observer and his writing of his interpretation in the format of the proper publication.

#### 1. Coordination:

One of the most vital steps in the production of an intelligence report by OCI is coordination with other offices in CIA, and, if the report is national intelligence, with other departments of the U.S. Government. However, coordination is attained in a number of ways. It may involve simple analyst-to-analyst contact or it may require an elaborate panel system or official review and sign-off by another department of government.

The panel system of substantive and editorial review by representatives of the intelligence agencies (CIA, INR, DIA) to achieve coordinated national current intelligence began when the Central Intelligence Bulletin replaced the Current Intelligence Bulletin in 1958. The system permits an exchange of views at the production level and also provides for an examination of each article by persons of divergent backgrounds and interests. If a disagreement cannot be resolved at the panel meeting or later between analysts, the other agency can take a dissenting footnote in which the disagreement is clearly spelled out, thereby permitting the consumer to evaluate the two positions and draw his own conclusions.

The coordinating process is even more involved in the case of the National Intelligence Survey. Upon receiving a manuscript of a section of the General Survey of the NIS from one of the production offices in CIA, the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence transmits the submission for coordination to INR and DIA. It is also sent to the appropriate American Embassy for comment if considered necessary by INR. This coordination frequently means extensive and detailed communication between analysts; the Embassy, too, often sends useful and detailed data or evaluations back to the producing analyst. Finally, after achieving coordination within the Intelligence Community, OBGI combines the various units

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received from all CIA components and other agencies into the General Survey, edits the entire package, and publishes the complete product as a coordinated document of the Intelligence Community.

In the case of departmental finished intelligence reports such as the Weekly Summary and Intelligence Memorandum, the coordinating process is far simpler and generally involves checking with other Agency offices which have interest and competence in the subject matter. Particularly, in the Intelligence Memorandum the analyst must indicate the extent of his coordination.

## 2. Editing and Review:

Generally, the editorial process in OCI occurs in two stages. The regional supervisors review the analysts' work looking particularly at the substantive treatment of the subject. They bring to the review a wider scope than the country-oriented outlook of the average analyst as well as a stronger feeling for the desires of top officials. Thereafter, a Production Officer (PO), who is both experienced as an editor and substantively informed about an area, checks the item for format and grammatical presentation.


In the specific case of the National Intelligence Survey, which has a rigid format and lengthy text, the editorial review is handled by specialists in each of the geographic divisions.

## 3. Deadlines:

Deadlines play a significant role for many publications and activities in OCI. Articles for the Central Intelligence Bulletin should be ready for panel consideration in mid-afternoon, although late arriving information or a fast moving crisis situation is generally sufficient excuse to forego the panel review. Articles for the Weekly Summary should be to the editor by Wednesday afternoon to enable the editor to plan the space allocations of the publication that evening. Intelligence Memoranda often have short deadlines--12 to 24 hours--and the analyst is further challenged because of the importance of the White House Staff consumer. Deadlines for the National Intelligence Survey are long--usually three to four months--but in view of the magnitude of the writing task and the required research, the analyst is pressed to turn out copy at a good rate.

## B. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

### 1. Central Intelligence Bulletin



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The purpose of the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), from its inception in 1951, has been each day to inform the President and high-level U.S. Government policy makers of the most noteworthy foreign developments and to provide an evaluation of them. The process of "informing the President" does not necessarily mean that he personally reads each edition of the publication; chief policy advisers on the White House Staff have often briefed presidents on selections from it. The CIB is the only national-level daily publication to be coordinated and approved by the three major members of the Intelligence Community: the Departments of State and Defense, and CIA.

The CIB is now published in three versions of different classification, each designed for a specific readership. The most sensitive goes only to some forty individuals who are senior advisers on foreign policy. The regular codeword version goes to about forty offices; the secret-level version is sent out in some 1,000 copies to analysts at home and abroad. The classification and sensitivity of the source material largely determine in which version an article will appear. Although the same item may appear unchanged in all three versions, the most highly classified version is usually abbreviated. In this version only the most critical areas and the most critical situations are covered. Its content averages five briefs and two notes, about half the number in the more widely disseminated secret book.

The Bulletin is the national daily current intelligence output of the Intelligence Community and can be regarded as a classified daily paper for a highly sophisticated clientele. It is assumed that the readers are interested in and knowledgeable about foreign affairs, that they will achieve continuity by reading the publication daily, that they are busy people who should not be burdened by unimportant items, and that they turn to the CIB for informed interpretation of both classified material and subjects covered by the press.

The present format of the Bulletin represents more than a decade of experience and adaptation, always with the goal of improving the presentation of current intelligence for busy top-level officials of the U.S. Government.

A brief contains about 250 words. The first sentence, which stands alone as a paragraph, contains the topical theme of the item. The succeeding paragraphs usually describe the new development, add pertinent background material, and, finally make an "outlook" assessment. A note--some 11 to 14 lines in length--is a one-paragraph comment on a situation without the introductory theme sentence. Notes are usually factual reporting where analysis is not needed, follow-ups to a previous CIB item in which there has not been a



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major development since the last brief, or resumes of a developing situation that is not yet of sufficient importance to present more extensively.

Among OCI divisions there is considerable variation in the production of a Bulletin item because neither the situation that gives rise to an item, the way in which it is initiated, nor the manner of its control in the branch and division can be standardized into a strict procedure. One factor, however, is constant: the situation must be significant for U.S. security interests and worthy of bringing to the attention of top U.S. policy makers, particularly those in the White House.

Let us assume that an item on Japan is written during normal working hours and thus is given the normal editing and coordination. In the morning's take of intelligence information, an analyst in the Japanese branch of OCI reads a cable from the American ambassador in Tokyo which analyzes student riots of the previous day and forecasts that imminent disturbances will provoke police retaliation that could bring down the government of Premier Sato. There is also a Clandestine Service report of Communist leadership in one faction of the student group. The morning's press carries an account of the rioting, but does not make the dismal forecasts outlined in the State cable from Tokyo.

The analyst confers with the branch chief about the situation and the thrust of a CIB item. They decide to feature the threat to Sato's government, and then, in the supporting paragraph of the item, to discuss the previous day's rioting and Communist involvement. The OCI analyst may call his colleague who handles [redacted] affairs in the Clandestine Service for further details and for his personal evaluation of the CS source. He may continue his coordinating activity by calling the specialist on [redacted] affairs in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for a quick reading of the situation. Armed with this collective insight, the analyst then writes the 250-300 word item based largely on the two relevant cables and the newspaper report, but relying also on his accumulated knowledge.

When the item is completed, the analyst passes it to his supervisor for review and then to the division's Production Officer (PO) for editing. The PO has known since midmorning that the item was being prepared and has informed the Panel Chairman and Panel Secretary about its probable submission at a late morning planning session. This session is attended by each of the division POs, the Panel Chairman and Secretary, and by representatives of the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Cartography Division of the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence.

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When he is satisfied with the item, the PO sends it to the Panel Secretary who has it "put on the wire" (LDX) to contact points in INR and in DIA for the Japan analysts there to examine. Before the 1530 panel meeting, the Panel Secretary and Panel Chairman review the item, and may request changes in wording or content. These persons are also concerned with the size of the CIB as well as the coverage of significant world developments.

At the afternoon panel meeting, which is under the chairmanship of a senior OCI official, are the Panel Secretary and POs from each of the four geographic divisions of OCI, and representatives from the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Clandestine Service as well as from the Departments of State (INR) and Defense (DIA).

The Panel Chairman takes up each CIB article in turn, trying to identify any differences of opinion. The articles are then referred as necessary to the OCI geographic branches for the analysts or supervisors to negotiate with their opposite numbers in State and/or DIA. If there is an unresolvable substantive disagreement, the chairman may request the dissenting department to take a footnote explaining why they do not concur. The CIB is considered to be the publication of the Director of Central Intelligence and, therefore, CIA does not take a footnote. Items based on intelligence information that comes in after the panel meeting, or is based on sources not available to State or DIA and therefore cannot be coordinated in a reasonable time, are bracketed; asterisks are used to indicate that either State or DIA has not yet had the opportunity to see the source.

After the panel meeting and after the final agreement between the analysts, the Panel Secretary makes the final check and sees that the Senior Duty Officer in the Operations Center and the Night Editor, who will follow through on the item during the night, have been properly briefed. The Senior Duty Officer watches the incoming intelligence information until each version of the CIB is "put to bed" starting about midnight for the secret version and ending with the highest classified at 0500, so they can be reproduced and distributed to top level consumers by 0800.

## 2. National Intelligence Survey

The finished intelligence presented in the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) is generally concerned with the description of relatively unchanging natural features, fundamental characteristics, and basic resources of a foreign country or area, and covers its geographic, oceanographic, transportation, sociological, political, economic, scientific, and military aspects. The NIS is a digest of basic

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intelligence, comprehensive in scope but selective in detail, designed to provide the foundation for high-level operational and policy planners in the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military services and major military commands, and other government agencies. The military are among its greatest users particularly for briefing purposes--both formal and individual--as well as for operational planning dealing with specific objectives and situations. The civilian officials, particularly those operating abroad, generally find the NIS most useful for briefing and background information on countries adjacent to the state in which they are located.

The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) provides direction to the Program. It establishes broad policies, allocates responsibility for production and maintenance of the NIS, sets priorities on individual countries or NIS sections, and determines dissemination. The NIS Committee, one of fourteen USIB committees, consists of representatives from the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force. The CIA representative is the Director of Basic and Geographic Intelligence (OBGI), and he is chairman of the Committee. His staff is responsible for general administration of the NIS Program. It also provides the final editorial review of the NIS contributions to ensure consistency and compliance with procedures and guidance promulgated by the NIS Committee, accomplishes the final processing and reproduction, disseminates the NIS in accordance with USIB policy, and provides administrative services.

Some 120-150 geographic areas need to be covered and the program has been set up to handle 30 General Surveys per year--usually each one covering a single country. The decision as to which 30 will be produced--either by initial coverage or by periodic maintenance--is decided by the NIS Committee, which is guided by the requirements as well as by the personnel resources of the participating agencies. Particular attention is given to the needs of the military services, which are among the principal users of the product. Schedules are normally set up at least one fiscal year in advance and usually about three to four months are allocated for the writing of an NIS section of the General Survey.

The production offices of the Directorate of Intelligence and the Clandestine Service, as well as offices in other U.S. Government departments, make contributions to the General Survey in their subject specialities. OCI is responsible for the introduction, political and sociological sections of the General Survey, plus a section on subversion.

The Introduction, or Significance of the Area, is a short exposition of fewer than 1,000 words that succinctly examines the important characteristics of the country, emphasizing those which determine its regional or international significance.

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Subdivision 4, Sociological, of the General Survey covers the social stability, characteristics of the society, population makeup and problems, manpower and labor conditions, health and welfare, education, cultural expression, and media of public information.

Subdivision 5, Political, of the General Survey describes governmental stability; structure and functioning of the government; political dynamics and the party system; key domestic, foreign and defense policies; propaganda programs; vulnerability to subversion; and the police and intelligence organizations.

The Section on Subversion assesses the general threat to the country, factors bearing on insurgency and subversion, activity of the local Communist Party and Communist fronts, non-Communist subversive groups, and the government's countersubversive policies and activities.

The analyst, in undertaking an NIS section, consults with his division's NIS coordinator to establish a deadline schedule and with the current intelligence specialists to get the feel for the country. He will ask the Central Reference Service for a machine-run on relevant topics and then begin an extensive reading of classified materials as well as unclassified books and periodicals to get the necessary background of factual knowledge.

Vital to a good NIS report is the preparation of a well-organized outline of the proposed unit. Here the analyst uses his ingenuity to adapt the general format to his individual country. Upon completion the analyst looks to the branch chief for a substantive review. Thereafter, the submission passes through a series of editorial steps which ensure compliance with the proper format until the NIS section goes from OCI to the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence for final review and editing. In OBGI the manuscript is given to recognized specialists in a certain type of subsection (e.g. education); then to an overall editor who checks to see that the format has been followed and that all required appendices and illustrative material are in good form. OBGI has in the meantime sent the submission for coordination to the Departments of State and Defense as mentioned previously.

### 3. Support Furnished to the Office of National Estimates

OCI participates in ONE's production of national estimates in several ways. The ONE Staff analyst responsible for writing the initial draft frequently "picks the brain" of the OCI specialist on a specific issue or a general problem. The ONE staffers also keep abreast of OCI publications as part of their reading to maintain knowledge on their areas of concern.

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For about ten percent of the estimates--especially those on a specialized subject--ONE will request a written contribution from OCI. The OCI contribution is usually factual and is sometimes used as an annex to the basic estimate. Later on, OCI will usually be asked by the ONE Staff to make comments on the draft estimate, and the appropriate specialist from OCI will sit in on the first discussion of the draft by the Board of National Estimates. Sometimes he or she takes part in subsequent stages of redrafting and coordinating the estimate.

4. Support for the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board

The National Indications Center, manned by CIA, NSA, and the Armed Services, is the joint operational and administrative staff of the USIB Watch Committee. The Center collates, analyzes, and evaluates intelligence materials received from the Intelligence Community to support the Watch Committee's mission of providing the earliest possible intelligence warning of, and continuing judgment on, any threat from Communist states.

Indications intelligence deals with a military threat to the United States, its forces, or its allies. It is generally strategic intelligence even though the Watch Committee gets into the most minute tactical details, like identification of specific small military units. Indications intelligence is a form of current intelligence although it is focused on the specific problem of possible attack.

The Center is also charged with updating the Indications List and making indications assessments. The Indications List applies to the USSR particularly and is a compendium of concrete actions which the USSR would be expected to take in preparation for war.

The Center, under the direction of a senior OCI official, has a complement of some thirty people drawn from CIA, NSA, and the three Service intelligence organizations. Of these, eleven compose a substantive staff and another eleven a watch component. The rest are supervisory or clerical. The Department of State is represented in the Center only during a crisis. The Air Force provides the Center's facilities, as well as its deputy director.

Within OCI, the Indications Officer (INDICO) has the responsibility for scanning incoming intelligence information for data pertaining to strategic warning of enemy attack and for ensuring that proper coordination and cooperation is maintained with the NIC in the Pentagon. He also serves as a relay point for reports, information, and requests from the Center to the offices of CIA. An

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important segment of INDICO's activity and responsibility is to assist in the preparation of the Watch Committee's weekly report.

Early in the week the staff of the NIC drafts a Preliminary Watch Report from the responses of the participating agencies to an agenda previously circulated. INDICO receives copies of this report and distributes it to OER, OSR, OSI, the Chief of OCI's Production Staff, the Far Eastern Division and the European Division of OCI, and to any other components that may have an interest. At a subsequent meeting of interested specialists, a CIA position is reached and the NIC quickly advised.

On Wednesday morning the USIB Watch Committee, attended by INDICO and other CIA representatives, meets at the NIC and goes over the new draft, which reflects changes suggested by the participating agencies. After accord is reached, the final report is prepared by NIC and sent to the agencies for their formal approval. On Thursday the Watch Committee report becomes the first order of business at the USIB meeting, and upon approval is then transmitted to top level interested U.S. Government officials. In addition, it is cabled to intelligence officials in the [redacted]

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C. DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE

Some of OCI's most significant intelligence production is not coordinated with other agencies of the U.S. Government. Although such publications do not carry the blessing of the Intelligence Community, they nevertheless may exert a great influence on the specialized consumer. One of these, the President's Daily Brief, is a personal intelligence report from the Director of Central Intelligence to the President. OCI's Intelligence Memoranda are designed for highly-placed consumers in the White House Staff and elsewhere and are responsive to their particular needs in support of policy formulation and of planning the implementation of policy. OCI's Weekly Summary is valuable to the foreign affairs specialist, and is particularly useful for personnel stationed abroad--civilian and military--who need to be continuously informed of world-wide developments.

1. President's Daily Brief

The Brief, begun for President Kennedy in 1961, is a personal report for the President. Its format, style of presentation, and time of delivery at the White House are adapted to the tastes and desires of each President. The Brief tries to anticipate

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policy questions and such special requirements as those which arise from the forthcoming visit of a foreign dignitary or from Presidential visits abroad. The publication is not coordinated with other intelligence agencies, but within CIA the items for the Brief are coordinated by the writers with analysts in OCI, OER, OSI, OSR, and FMSAC when relevant. The PDB is reviewed by the Director of Current Intelligence, and advanced drafts are sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and the DD/I.

The President's Daily Brief is all-source and makes heavy use of CS cabled intelligence information reports. The articles offer a comprehensive survey of the day's receipt of intelligence information compressed into from two to five legal-size pages. The style of writing is informal and succinct. The items combine facts and intelligence judgments and are based on the assumption that the President is generally acquainted with each subject. It is published every day except Sunday and is now delivered to the White House at 0630.

## 2. Weekly Summary

The Secret level Weekly Summary--and its more highly classified version--reports current intelligence in more perspective than is possible with the close deadlines and space limitations of the daily Bulletin. It is able to provide the continuity that the daily lacks, and to present more speculative judgments than is possible in the coordinated CIB. Because of its wide geographical and topical coverage, the Weekly is an excellent global wrap-up for overseas posts that need information on world situations apart from those of their own immediate concern. Usually accompanying the Weekly Summary are from one to three separately published Special Reports that in some six or eight pages examine a country situation in more detail than is possible in the Weekly itself. In July 1969 the approximate weekly dissemination outside CIA was: Weekly Summary, 1,000 copies; and Special Reports, 630 copies. Highlights of the Weekly Summary are also sent out by cable to CIA stations and some military commands.

There is considerable variation in the length and manner of presentation of articles in the Weekly Summary, but articles in this 28 to 32 page publication generally are about 450 words long and divided into recognized parts. The title is itself a summary--"Middle East Situation Remains Critical"--rather than only a label. The first paragraph, of one or more sentences, contains the conclusion developed later in the article. The follow-up paragraphs, unlike those in a newspaper where the important news comes first, are arranged to support the discussion. Ideally, each begins with a topic sentence.

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The last paragraph is often an outlook on how the situation may develop and its implications for U.S. security interests (usually stated in terms of its implications for the country involved rather than for the U.S.). A summary of the salient points of the article is placed in the table of contents and generally forms the highlights sent by cable to overseas posts.

The Special Report starts with an introduction that contains information not repeated in the body of the article and that leads naturally into the first background or detailed sections of the article. The main section begins with a historical or other logical opening and proceeds into a discussion of the problem at hand. It ends with a section that speculates on the outcome.

Preparation of the Weekly Summary begins on Monday morning when analysts in OCI, OER and OSR consult with their supervisors about possible topics. In mid-morning there is a Planning Meeting of Production Officers from OCI and representatives from OER and OSR with the Weekly Chairman and the Weekly Secretary at which the publication is planned. Articles on non-crisis situations are due the following day; those on crisis areas, at midweek. By Thursday noon the space allocations are rigid and there can be no significant change in length or content of an article. The Weekly Summary is printed Thursday evening and distributed to the Intelligence Community on Friday morning.

There is extensive coordination among the components of the Agency in the production of an article for the Weekly. Analysts consult widely within the Office of Current Intelligence, and with colleagues in OER and OSR--occasionally with ONE and the Clandestine Service--when necessary. Both OER and OSR contribute a significant number of articles to the Weekly dealing with economic and military developments.

### 3. Intelligence Memorandum (IM)

The IM style is more flexible than that of many other OCI publications. There is usually an introduction or summary of several paragraphs that outlines the problem. This is followed by the main text, numbered by paragraph, which is a logical development of the subject. Frequently, the text begins with a brief history of the situation, is followed by a discussion of the various salient features, and ends with an outlook section. The approach may vary considerably from one memorandum to another, however. The length is also flexible--three to ten pages are usual, but 25 to 50 are not uncommon. Like other intelligence publications, the Memorandum strives for clarity and unbiased presentation. It is designed for readers who are interested in the subject at hand and willing to give some time to reading about the problem.

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The IM may provide an unusual challenge to the analyst from three viewpoints; it is a response to a specific request--often from a high level official, it frequently poses difficult deadline requirements, and it permits the analyst to combine background and relevant facts of a situation in one article. An IM requested by the White House Staff or high CIA officials receives priority treatment and generally comes with a tight deadline and little advanced warning. The deadlines are often one working day or less, though in the case of generalized background articles the deadline may be several weeks. The IM often receives top level scrutiny in OCI and CIA because of the importance of its requesters, and after passing through the usual editorial process the Memorandum is reviewed by the Chief of the Production Staff before being submitted to the D/OCI, DD/I and the Director of Central Intelligence for approval to disseminate. Each Memorandum states clearly which office prepared it and the extent of coordination within CIA.

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## PRODUCTION SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

### A. SUPPORT FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

OCI has three significant roles in supporting the National Security Council and its subordinate bodies. (The OCI briefing function is discussed later.) Most of this support is directed toward the policy recommendation function of the Council, which is conducted by the NSC Review Group.

The National Security Council, before making a policy decision, often has a response to a National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) prepared on the problem at hand. The NSSM is frequently sent to the appropriate offices in CIA for preparation of the response. In the period from January to July 1969, OCI prepared or coordinated the response to fifty of these Study Memoranda.

A second type of support is given to the NSC Review Group, which is charged with preparation of the agenda items for policy recommendations by the NSC. The CIA representative on the Review Group is the Deputy Director for Intelligence, and he may ask the OCI desk analyst to prepare a paper or to comment on a memorandum initiated by some other office. Such contributions stress the intelligence information pertinent to the situation.

Another form of NSC support involves OCI's relationship to the Interdepartmental Groups (IGs). Five of the six IGs are responsible for geographic areas, and the CIA representative (the appropriate area chief in the Clandestine Service) looks to the OCI area specialists for substantive support. This support ranges from informal oral comments to formal papers presenting the CIA position.

### B. OPERATION OF TASK FORCES

#### 1. Area Crisis

An area task force is activated when the DD/I or D/OCI decides that a situation has become critical from an intelligence standpoint, that special production procedures are necessary, and that a 24-hour watch by area experts is required. The branch personnel, augmented by analysts from other components who may be able to make contributions, are located in the Operations Center, where they have special cable facilities, graphics displays, and

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administrative support. All offices in the Directorate of Intelligence are instructed to establish named contact points for easy communication with the task force. Close communication is maintained with the Clandestine Service to facilitate the quick exchange of information and the levying of collection requirements.

Personnel are organized into shifts for round-the-clock operation, and the task force leader--usually the regional supervisor--assigns responsibilities for reading incoming intelligence information, writing situation reports, and preparing the regular publications. Most task forces produce three or four situation reports a day. Each maintains a log so that each shift knows what the previous shifts produced and what production requirements were levied on them. In complicated situations, such as the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1967, a liaison officer is appointed to handle contacts between an interagency working group for the entire Intelligence Community and the DD/I's task force. This man assigns requested memoranda, or other production requirements, to the task force or appropriate agency component and monitors their production and eventual dissemination.

During the administration of President Johnson, OCI participated in 18 area task forces. A few task forces, such as those dealing with Greece and Cyprus, lasted for only a few days; the task force handling the first Dominican Republic crisis in 1965 lasted for several months. The lives of several task forces dealing with specific major developments in Vietnam were of intermediate length.

## 2. Trips of the President and Vice President

A trip abroad by the President or Vice President is generally known several weeks in advance, and support procedures can be instituted well before the actual journey. The Office of National Estimates, in consultation with OCI, prepares a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on security conditions in the country or countries to be visited. After publication of the SNIE, OCI has the responsibility for its daily update in the form of a memorandum. In some cases, memorandum production may commence a month before the trip and continue for its duration; however, a shorter time span is more usual. During the trip, the task force functioning in the Operations Center will maintain an elaborate graphics display. The task force prepares daily cables on events of interest both in the countries to be visited and in surrounding areas, as well as significant items not covered in the regular publications. OCI's regular publications are transmitted to the



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Presidential party--usually in special cable versions at times convenient for the party.

On two occasions, such as President Johnson's trip to the Far East in October 1966 and the summit meeting at Punta del Este in 1967, OCI personnel have acted as briefing officers for the Presidential party. In performing this service they have helped to lessen the demands on [REDACTED] who could then devote more attention to security problems. During the Johnson administration, there were seven Presidential trips. President Nixon was similarly served during his trip to Western Europe and his round-the-world journey in 1969.

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### C. THE WATCH AND ALERTING FUNCTION

The CIA Operations Center, (see following chart) which is located in the OCI area and is managed by the Director of Current Intelligence for the DD/I, provides a number of special facilities and services 24 hours a day. A Senior Duty Officer (SDO), who is supported by three Watch Officers, is the single point of contact with the other Operation Centers in CIA and in the Intelligence Community. He is responsible for alerting the Director of Central Intelligence, the DD/I, and all other senior Agency officials. The Watch Officers receive and screen all incoming intelligence information on an all-source basis, including press teletype. Internal and external alerts are issued and selected intelligence information is rapidly disseminated within the Agency.

The responsibilities of the Operations Center are particularly heavy during the hours from 1700 to 0800 weekdays and throughout the weekend, when only a few of the regular OCI staff are on duty to support the SDO. The SDO must keep the Central Intelligence Bulletin current by checking both classified traffic and press ticker to change articles already prepared, and add new items.

The personnel of the Operations Center also furnish close support for each task force. An all-source working area is set aside for the exclusive use of a task force where telephone services for all four systems (black, red, green, and grey) are available. Facilities are available to permit the rapid establishment of field teletype teleconferences. A second task force can be handled by converting the Situation Room into a task force space.

The Operations Center is well equipped with communications facilities. There is twenty-four-hour service on the four telephone

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
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# THE CIA OPERATIONS CENTER



## RECEIVES

CIA Reports  
State Cables  
Military Cables  
FBI Reports  
Press & Radio  
(incl. AP, UPI, Reuters tickers)  
Comint  
Tripartite link messages  
Other

## ALERTS & CONSULTS

Senior CIA officials  
USIB officials  
Senior US govt. officials

CIA analysts  
Cable secretariat  
IW  
White House  
NIC  
State Operations Center & RCI  
DIA (ISIC)  
JCS (NMCC)  
Army, Navy, Air  
NSA (Command Center)  
AEC  
FBI

## PRODUCES or SUPPORTS

Presidents Brief  
CIB  
Night Journal  
Intelligence Memoranda  
"Selects"  
AM Briefing of DCI  
Indications Control Officer

## ADMINISTERS or CONTROLS

(esp. outside normal duty hours)  
"On call" lists  
Motor Pool arrangements  
Printing & graphic requirements  
Courier service  
Security problems  
Intelligence Support of DCI

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\* 24 HRS.-A-DAY COMMUNICATION & EXCHANGES

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In addition to the communications facilities, the Operations Center can provide typing, reproduction, and clerical support around the clock. The Center also provides space for the President's Daily Brief group, and the News Analysis Officer who disseminates press ticker during normal working hours. An overnight editor, with production support, operates in the Center from 2230 to 0700 each day. The Clandestine Service Duty Officer, who is assigned space in the Center, receives all operational traffic and acts as the non-working hours alerting officer for the Clandestine Service. In the Situation Room, the Center prepares and maintains graphic displays and textual data on U.S. and friendly military plans and operations. The room is available for briefings, for conferences, and for use as a second Task Force Area if required.

The night SDO is responsible for preparing the Operations Center Night Journal seven days a week. This is a two- or three-page publication that gists important cables or press items received during the night that the SDO believes top Agency officials and area analysts should be aware of at the opening of business. The SDO also briefs the Director of Current Intelligence or his deputy on world-wide developments at the opening of business each morning.

The Operations Center has a special relationship with both the White House Situation Room and the National Military Command Center (NMCC). The CIA Center supplies duty officers--who serve under

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White House direction--to ensure that material received in CIA is transmitted expeditiously to those on the White House Staff who need to have the latest intelligence information. The Operations Center also mans a 24-hour liaison desk in the NMCC as CIA's link with this organization in the Pentagon.

#### D. BRIEFING AND LIAISON ACTIVITIES

##### 1. Briefings

The Production Staff of OCI is the focal point for CIA in the preparation of briefings to be delivered by the Director of Central Intelligence and other top Agency officials to a wide variety of audiences. The Staff accommodates its style of preparation to the Director's manner of speaking--informal and conversational, using colorful words and colloquialisms when appropriate--that enables him to read the notes without appearing stilted. By reading prepared notes, the Director is able to discuss highly technical and controversial subjects without danger of misstatement. In addition to the formal briefing, the Director is provided with backup material, providing either further details on the major subject or short resumes of other topics on which he might be questioned.

In addition to standardizing the submissions of the various contributing geographic and functional offices of CIA, the Production Staff provides a substantive review of the draft notes, ensuring that all facets of a problem are accurately discussed, that no information is taken for granted by area specialists, and that statements that might be inappropriate for political or other reasons are deleted. It also arranges for graphics and follows through to see that they are accurate. The briefings are organized in outline form: by one-sentence principal thoughts (I, II, III, etc.), supported by explanatory statements (A, B, C...), each in turn buttressed by relevant supporting discussion (1, 2, 3, etc.).

The National Security Council and congressional committees are among the most significant regular audiences for the Director. During 1969, the Director gave twenty-five briefings to the NSC and fourteen briefings to congressional groups. In addition, he occasionally briefed the President and his Assistant for National Security Affairs. In most cases, the notes were specially prepared for the event, with little hold-over from previous briefing.

In addition to preparing briefing notes for the Director, the Production Staff gives weekly current intelligence briefings to the staff of CIA's Office of Personnel and of the CIA Library. In addition, a large number of briefings are given by supervisors and

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specialists in OCI's geographic divisions to a wide variety of CIA and other government officials.

E. PARTICIPATION IN INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEES

Throughout the period of OCI's existence, its analysts have frequently been called upon to serve as the Agency or Office representatives on committees of the Intelligence Community and of policy-making agencies in the government. In his capacity as an Agency representative, the OCI specialist has a primary responsibility for furnishing intelligence pertinent to the needs of the committee.

These committees vary widely in their formality of organization and membership, their functions, and their duration. The committee dealing with the Rhodesian question was active for only about two years: that concerned with the Berlin problem has continued for a decade. Frequently, an interagency crisis committee is allowed to recess when the crisis cools down and then is reactivated if the situation again becomes critical.

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## PROSPECTS

The finished intelligence required for U.S. National Security policy making and implementation during the next five years will be increasingly national, as opposed to departmental. This will be true both in localized political turbulence in the underdeveloped world and in troubles between the great powers. Research and analysis regarding Communist China must be greatly increased during this period, without relaxing any of the effort devoted to the USSR. Vietnam is likely to demand attention, even after a cease-fire, for a number of years.

The volume and detail of intelligence information will increase appreciably. It is anticipated that clashes of interest among nations may well continue to occur at least as frequently as in the past few years, and new armed conflicts are likely. New technical intelligence collection systems likely to be operative in the 1970's will have a sharp impact on the current intelligence program. To handle the greatly increased volume of information and to exploit the material properly, OCI probably will have to make very rapid analyses of data, expand after-hours shift operations, require analysts to develop new skills in the rapid interpretation of information, and purchase new processing equipment.

Many OCI analysts in the 1970's will be assisted in their work by computers. The recently installed IBM 360 Model 67 is intended primarily for use by analysts at Headquarters. Analysts will operate this time-sharing computer through typewriter keyboards (called remote terminals) which are tied in to the computer. The analyst will be able to put into the computer memory any information he wants stored; he can develop programs for manipulating the information; and he can get the computer to print out on his terminal some of the stored information, or the results of manipulation of the data. In the future, it will also be possible for the analyst to call on data and programs which other analysts have put into the computer's memory. The computer output may either be printed out by the typewriter, or may be shown on a cathode ray tube.

In the future, computers may disseminate intelligence information to analysts, thus making possible a reduction in the number of documents which the analyst receives in his inbox. The texts of documents would be placed in the computer, together with the identification of analysts who should see them. At the analyst's command, the computer

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
would show documents on the cathode ray tube until the analyst stops the display, or until the documents keyed for him have been exhausted. When he sees part or all of a document which he would like to have in his own computer file, he could have the text transferred from the disseminating computer to the time-sharing computer.

For several reasons, the computer is not as useful to the current intelligence analyst as it is to the researcher. Because most current intelligence information, by its nature, is of value for only a relatively short time, the OCI analyst is less likely to build the large background files required by analysts doing long term economic and military research. Furthermore, relatively little current intelligence information is received in quantitative terms and seldom lends itself to arranging in tabular form. Moreover, in view of the amount of time and work involved in converting present document files into computer files, when computer dissemination becomes available the current intelligence analyst will begin putting his current document flow into the time-sharing computer while continuing to draw as well on his manual files until they are sufficiently outdated to be discarded.



SELECTED READINGS

The following readings are either illustrative of the philosophy and concepts pertinent to current intelligence or are descriptive of various components or related activities of the Office of Current Intelligence. Except for [redacted] of the Board of National Estimates, and [redacted] of the Office of Economic Research, all authors are or were members of the Office of Current Intelligence.





## INTELLIGENCE FOR THE POLICY CHIEFS\*

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In this discussion of intelligence needs at the top national level and some specific ways in which they are filled, I shall be speaking from the perspective of CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence. I will not attempt to speak for the other organizations of the Washington intelligence community or pretend to be presenting the whole picture.

First it will be useful to say who the people are that are served by what we call national, as opposed to departmental, intelligence. We start with the President, of course. But we must take into account certain members of his personal staff and in particular his special assistant handling national security affairs and his staff. Next come the heads of departments, in particular State and Defense, the military chiefs, and the heads of independent agencies dealing with foreign affairs. Then there are numerous interagency bodies established for the purpose of recommending policy; the Committee of Principals on disarmament is an example. And at the senior level are also the regional proconsuls, such as Ambassador Lodge in Vietnam and Ambassador Bunker in Santo Domingo, who have been delegated extraordinary authority.

But in the end the buck stops at the President's desk, and the advent of the nuclear age has greatly multiplied the number of things he must decide personally. He has almost become, in Richard Neustadt's words, "a decision machine." His decisions in international affairs are influenced by many people and institutions, but in particular by those just mentioned.

The requirements for intelligence at this national level are particularly fascinating because they are so kaleidoscopic. They change with the men, they change with the times, they change with the bureaucratic structure, they change with each policy decision. As a result, it is possible to generalize only most broadly on the needs of the

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\* Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 1967), pp. 1-12.

\*\* [REDACTED] is a senior CIA current intelligence officer. The article is adapted from a paper he prepared for presentation at

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senior policy maker. He certainly must be provided, if possible, with what he thinks he needs to know. He sometimes should be provided with things the intelligence people think he should know. Often he must be given material which in the beginning neither he nor the intelligence officer realized would be needed--material generated by the interaction between the two as they work together.

#### Lines of Contact

The most direct way of finding out what the senior policy maker needs is to ask him. Fortunately, all DCI's have had regular direct access to the President and have not been reluctant to ask what he wants. Meetings in person or talks between the two by phone are more frequent than most people, including Washington political insiders, realize. Mr. McCone, for example, met every morning with President Johnson throughout the first weeks of his administration to deliver an early morning intelligence brief.

There is of course a limit on access to the President and the time he has available. But we are in frequent touch with the other senior policy makers, who not only know their own needs but have a pretty good idea of the President's. Then communication and rapport with the President's immediate staff are of great importance. These men close to him are in the best position to make his needs known. At present they usually do this by telephoning the Director or his Deputy for Intelligence.

We are constantly receiving requests for information and analysis from the White House staffers who handle national security affairs, and it is an advantage that some of our former officers have served or are serving on this staff. For example, when [ ] received his special assignment to concentrate on South Vietnamese problems we asked him how, as a former member of the Office of National Estimates, he felt we could best meet his needs. He asked for a periodic summary of economic and pacification developments in South Vietnam, information that tends to get buried in the welter of military reporting, and we now have such a weekly publication tailored especially for him.

Moving from the White House to the Pentagon, the Agency has an intelligence officer serving in the office of Secretary McNamara. He is attuned to the Secretary's needs and levies many requirements on us for him. These supplement those that come directly from Mr. McNamara through his frequent meetings with the Director.

Over at State we have a new mechanism called the Senior Interdepartmental Group, chaired by the Under Secretary of State and compri-

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S E C R E T

sing top representation from agencies concerned with foreign affairs, including the DCI. The SIG is responsible for insuring that foreign policy problems requiring interdepartmental attention receive systematic consideration. It stands at the apex of a series of Interdepartmental Regional Groups chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for each region. Intelligence is represented on each of these groups, too. They thrash out new regional policy recommendations which then move on through the Senior Group to the Secretary. In essence, the new system attempts to apply in Washington the country-team approach of a large American embassy abroad. We expect these groups to become particularly important in the slower-moving policy problems; the big, Class-A flaps tend to bypass any set institutional framework, generating their own high-level task forces responsive directly to the President.

Outside the departments there are the several statutory or ad hoc committees with special tasks in the field of foreign affairs. Intelligence is represented on many of these bodies, for example on the Economic Defense Advisory Committee concerned with Western multilateral trade to Communist countries and on the Advisory Committee on Export Policy handling U.S. unilateral controls.\*

Last but by no means least, to discover the needs of the policy maker there is always the "old boy" net: people we have known, gone to school with, worked with, played with, fought with, and whom we are now in contact with either on the policy level or in intelligence components. To take one good example, one of our representatives eight years ago at the first Intelligence Methods Conference, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] From these people, because they know us and we know them, we get a constant stream of suggestions as to the needs of the men above them, and we usually hear quickly when what we produce fails to meet those needs--so that we can try again.

#### Tailoring

How do the needs of the senior policy maker, these "national" requirements, differ from departmental requirements? To my mind they can be distinguished in two ways: first, if they involve more than one department's interests and it is either difficult or plain impossible to separate out each department's responsibility;

\* See [REDACTED] "Intelligence for Economic Defense" in Studies VIII 2, p. 33 ff.

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second, if they are so critical that the judgment of more than one department is desired. More simply, you might say that when any of the people or groups we have been talking about asks you something, you know it is a national requirement because they are all involved in the making of national policy. It is almost impossible today to identify a national policy matter that lies wholly within the sphere of one department.

What level of detail does the policy maker require? No clear-cut answer can be given. In the Cuban missile crisis one did not have to be clairvoyant to know the President was himself handling all the details of the naval quarantine and that he personally wanted to know the exact location of every Soviet merchant ship that might be bound for Cuba. We did not wait to be asked, we simply sent the information on as fast as we obtained it. At certain points in the Laotian crisis in the spring of 1961 also, it became obvious that, as Ambassador Winthrop Brown put it, the President was the "Laotian desk officer." And everyone knows how greedy for information an area desk can be.

There are some other maxims. Anytime the lives of a country's nationals, civilian or military, are endangered in foreign countries, the highest level wants to know about it quickly and in as much detail as possible. Communist kidnappings in Latin America, helicopter shootdowns in the Berlin area, or for that matter shootdowns anywhere--in all these cases the President wants to get the complete word. These days when he must spend a great deal of time with the Vietnamese war, we have found it wise to err on the side of giving too much in this field rather than too little.

Beyond these cases where it is obvious that you shoot the works, there are only rules of thumb. We have come, fortunately or no, a long way since the good old days of the one-page precis so favored by General Marshall. If we are specifically asked for something by a senior policy maker and no length is mentioned, we write as much as we think required to do the job, no more. Then we ask someone to review it and cut it in half for us. If this cannot be done--or even if it can--we put a summary up front.

If we have not been asked specifically but feel it desperately important to get something across to the senior policy maker, brevity is the overriding virtue. Conclusions and judgments are the nub; argumentation can come later. If his appetite is whetted, if he wants to know more, or if he violently disagrees, we expect to pick up some feedback somewhere along the line so that we can follow through with more detail as necessary.

It is here that the regularly scheduled publication, the daily or the weekly, comes into play. By and large we find that such publications prepared for senior policy makers should hit the high spots. It is not necessary for them to carry all the classified news that's fit to print. They should serve rather as an alert to any developments which might directly or indirectly affect the nation's security. In the course of preparing them every bit of information the intelligence officer can get his hands on is reviewed, but it is then put through a very fine screening. If the policy maker wants more on a given subject or if the intelligence officer thinks the policy maker needs more, a separate memorandum or paper is written.

#### Communication Hazards

There are always difficulties in maintaining contact with the policy maker. One difficult situation is when he is on the road--how to get to him in an emergency, how to keep up his continuity of information. We have partly solved this one through a system of briefing cables tailored specifically for the high-level traveler. They consist in the main of a synopsis from our daily publication supplemented by material in which the traveler may have a special interest because of the area he is visiting or the people he is meeting.

Sooner or later, a period seems to come when the demands on the time of the senior policy maker are so enormous as to preclude our getting through to him in any way at all. In these circumstances we can only wait for an opening and hope he may be able to take a quick look at our regularly scheduled intelligence publications. In these we note the things that he really should not miss even if he is spending 100% of his time on Vietnam or the Dominican Republic.

When Mr. Kennedy became President, he brought with him a deep interest in foreign affairs, a voracious appetite for reading, a retentive memory, and above all a different style of doing things. Our publications in January 1961 simply did not fit his needs. Our primary daily publication was the Central Intelligence Bulletin. It had been expressly asked for by President Truman. Then it was specially adapted to meet President Eisenhower's needs, and although we had tried to alter it further it did not suit President Kennedy's style and he did not read it.

We were thus without a daily link or any periodic link with which to carry out our critical alerting function. We bent every effort to restore contact. Finally we succeeded, adopting a new publication different in style, classification, format, and length but not different in fundamental concept--a medium whereby we present

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to the President in the tersest possible form what he should know about the play of the world for that day, particularly as it impinges on U.S. national security interests. This publication became the President's alone, leaving the Bulletin to serve readers at the next level down.

There remains one other basic problem of communication with the policy maker. That is that the desk-level intelligence analyst, the fellow at the heart of the process, is never going to have all the clues to what is making the high-level world go 'round. He does not sit in on the National Security Council sessions. The Director, who does, cannot for various reasons--the need-to-know principle, the sheer physical impossibility of spreading the correct word and feel down far enough--fully communicate it to the analyst. I submit, however, that the analyst is not thereby relieved of his responsibility to keep track of developments in national policy. The daily press and the favored columnists are excellent sources. If the President or the Secretary of State delivers a speech on foreign policy, it will be revealing and should be read. I suspect that the percentage of intelligence analysts who read such speeches is still far from 100%. You hear the argument that the less one knows about policy the more objective one's analysis is. But the counterargument that you cannot produce intelligence in a vacuum, cannot recognize threats to U.S. policy interests unless you know what those interests are, seems to me overriding.

#### From Need to Deed

So on the question of requirements for intelligence at the national level, we might summarize as follows: In large and complex governments, there are no simple ways to determine the full range of the policy maker's needs. They change as situations emerge, develop, and subside. Communication--free and easy contact in an atmosphere of confidence--is essential to the smooth working of the intelligence-policy relationship. Mechanisms can be established to speed the flow of intelligence up and requirements down, and these mechanisms are essential. But nothing is so valuable as an effective person-to-person relationship. In our country all policy authority and decision rest ultimately in one man. It is he that intelligence must serve.

Now we turn to how we go about filling the policy maker's needs, however expressed or divined. This is a discussion of technique, and form, and formula. Again let me stress that I am not saying, "This is the way to do it," but "This is the way we in CIA are doing it." We do it both by working in concert with other members of the intelligence community and by preparing unilateral reports.

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The scope of the information we process is determined by the nature of the information that comes in and by the range of national security interests it impinges on. The form in which it is processed is determined by the requirements of the consumers, in particular the quite personal requirements and preferences of the President. From the beginning almost twenty years ago, the DCI has considered his role to be that of the President's number-one intelligence officer, responsible for seeing to it that the President is kept unexceptionably informed and directing the work of the entire intelligence community to that end.

In the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the White House has generally preferred to deal with big problems by calling together the top policy makers, putting all the available information on the table, and then discussing possible courses of U.S. policy and action. This method of operating places a premium on rapid intelligence support. "Rapid" does not necessarily imply crash assessments, thoughts formulated on the run. It is more often a matter of reshaping or resynthesizing for the occasion the assessments we have already published in our regular production routine. I want to underscore the importance of a deep and stable base of day-to-day intelligence production. This is what enables us to respond quickly to big and little flaps, whatever the subject or area.

#### Regular Production

The routine production base includes three "national" intelligence publications representing the coordinated views of the intelligence community and dealing respectively with past, present, and future. The past, so to speak, is represented by the National Intelligence Survey, an agreed-upon basic compendium of factual detail and historical development. The future is represented by the National Intelligence Estimate, containing the best thinking the community can put forward on a given problem for future U.S. policy. The present is represented by the Central Intelligence Bulletin, the daily which brings current developments to the attention of high-level readers in brief form.

The procedure for coordinating the evaluations made in the Bulletin among the agencies of the intelligence community may be of interest. Each day the items are drafted in the CIA Office of Current Intelligence, often with help from analysts in CIA's economic, scientific, and technical research components, and circulated to the community by secure communications channels. They are reviewed by the competent desks and branches within CIA, in the Defense Intelligence Agency, and in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

at the State Department, whose representatives then meet in the afternoon, bringing such changes, additions, or deletions as the desks may have suggested. An agreed version is hammered out, footnotes being used, as in national estimates, to register any sharp dissent. By six o'clock in the evening the draft Bulletin constitutes agreed national current intelligence. Before the publication reaches its readers at the opening of business the next morning, however, it has to be updated. We in CIA make the changes unilaterally, so marking them. The Bulletin's reporting on Vietnam, for example, will incorporate information received up to 4:30 in the morning: this is not an hour conducive to formal coordination.

Besides coordinating these community publications we produce others under the CIA imprint, some of which may also be coordinated with other agencies. A weekly world roundup reviews current reporting in a little deeper perspective, and one or two special annexes accompanying it usually treat some current problem in a fairly comprehensive way. Then there are regular publications for particular purposes such as a daily Vietnam situation report, the weekly Vietnam report I mentioned, a weekly tailored to the needs and agenda of the new Senior Interdepartmental Group, and monthly compilations on shipping to North Vietnam and Cuba.

#### Special Publications

A problem common to these regular issuances is created by the conflicting demands of classification and dissemination. We want to serve as broadly as possible everyone in the government requiring intelligence information for the performance of his duties. On the other hand, we want to be able to publish information of the most restrictive classifications. We tightly limited the dissemination of the Central Intelligence Bulletin from its inception in order to make its content as comprehensible as possible. But new collection mechanisms with highly compartmentalized reporting systems now supply information which cannot go even to all recipients of the Bulletin. There are valid reasons for the restrictions, but they make it impossible to serve the Director and the President adequately with normal publications.

We are therefore forced to create new and ever more tightly controlled special publications for these readers. They are prepared by a very small number of senior officers and go outside the Agency in only a very few copies. Their content is governed by the concept that there can be no piece of information so highly classified or so sensitive that it cannot be passed to the President. The main one is the President's Daily Brief. It generally follows the lines of the Bulletin, but it contains added material



too sensitive for the wider audience and is written in a more sprightly style, with less concern for citing the evidence underlying the judgments expressed.

Inevitably, some such publications become more widely known and get into such demand that their dissemination creeps up, no matter how hard we fight it. At this point, lest the added circulation destroy their purpose, we put sensitive information on a separate page included only in the copies of the prime recipients.

The trouble with regular publications, in addition to the classification problem, is that they tend to have fixed deadlines, format, and dissemination schedules and hence suffer in flexibility and timeliness. As a result, we have been turning increasingly to individual intelligence memoranda to meet many of our responsibilities. Then we can let the requirements of the particular case dictate the deadline, the format, and the distribution, as well as the classification.

For the CIA research components one of the most important developments in recent years has been a sharp increase in the servicing of policy makers with memoranda and longer reports devoted to particular policy issues. This reflects both a more sensitive appreciation on our part of precisely what kinds of intelligence are required and a growing awareness among policy officials that intelligence can be responsive and helpful on some of the more troublesome questions underlying their decisions. A few of the economic studies done recently in support of policy decisions have been on the effects of economic sanctions against South Africa, the logistic situation of the Communist forces in Vietnam, the effectiveness of U.S. bombing there, the consequences of certain proposed actions in the Zambia-Rhodesia crisis, and the implications of change in U.S. economic policy toward the Communist world.

From scientific and technical research come, for example, special memoranda concerning foreign military research and development, especially in the USSR and Communist China, for consumers such as the President's Scientific Advisor and Advisory Board, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Director for Defense Research and Engineering in the Department of Defense. These officials have an important role in determining the direction U.S. military research and development must take to counter the Soviet and Chinese threat. They often require more detail than is presented in the standard National Intelligence Estimate, or they require very specific answers to equally specific technical questions. Such memoranda are often accompanied by a briefing.

The intelligence memorandum originally prepared in answer to a specific request from a senior policy maker also tends to generate additional, self-initiated memoranda either to update the first response or to insure that the recipient, in concentrating on a narrow aspect of a problem, doesn't overlook something else that is germane. Finally, in servicing such requests from the policy maker you build up over a period of time an intuitive sense of what he is going to ask, and you anticipate it.

### The Operations Center

Another way we endeavor to insure that we are providing timely and useful intelligence support is to know what is going on with U.S. operational forces. We have found that our top customer regularly expects a full picture of any crisis situation, particularly where U.S. forces are involved or may become involved. To be able to marry the kinds of data wanted on U.S. operations with the customary intelligence on foreign activities and developments, the intelligence producers need regular inputs not only from the intelligence collectors but from the operators. We need immediate access to the operational people in National Military Command Center in the Pentagon. We need to know the directives State is about to send to embassies in crisis situations.

To deal with this problem, we have recently expanded our former Watch Office into an Operations Center. The Center continues to have the watch office function of filtering incoming information and alerting the proper people as necessary. Outside of normal office hours it is directed by an experienced generalist of senior rank. It has teleprinter service from the [redacted] and from the National Security Agency. It has secure teleprinter and voice communications with the White House, Pentagon, and State Department, and through these switchboards with American military and governmental outposts all over the world. The amount of information received and screened in the Center is now running in excess of a million items a year.

The Operations Center maintains up-to-date briefing information on critical situations and areas in a special situation room. When there is a major flap, a task force with representatives from all of the components involved can be pulled into the Center to operate there on a 24-hour basis if necessary. (At one period we had four task forces going--on Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, and Kashmir. I must say it got a little crowded in there.) During the Dominican crisis, the Director called for situation reports every hour on the hour, around the clock. To a certain degree Vietnam reporting now remains in the same category.

The point is, of course, that the policy makers have gone tactical in their concerns, and apparently this is the way it will be whenever the United States is engaged in a fast-moving potentially dangerous situation. At such times the President and his top cabinet officers become involved in day-by-day and hour-by-hour operational planning, down to the selection of targets and the deployment and commitment of troops. This is because of the world-wide political implications of tactical decisions today, and it is made possible by the capabilities of modern communications systems. The situation room in the White House is manned by seven of our experienced watch officers borrowed from the Operations Center, who are no longer completely unnerved to find the President peering over their shoulder at almost any hour.

#### Fund of Confidence

In summary, we might say that in a system to support the senior policy maker two ingredients are essential--a good production base and a readiness to adapt it as necessary. One must be alert to the changing needs of the policy maker, and be ready to meet them. Above all, there must be a pool of experienced intelligence officers, both generalists and specialists, with continuity in their jobs and objectivity in their outlook. Ted Sorenson wrote in Decision-Making in the White House:

No President, of course, pays attention to all the information he receives, nor can he possibly remember it all. What he actually considers and retains may well be the key to what he decides, and these in turn may depend on his confidence in the source and on the manner in which the facts are presented. He is certain to regard some officials and periodicals with more respect than others. He is certain to find himself able to communicate more easily with some staff members than others. He is certain to find that some reports or briefing books have a higher reliability than others.

We want the policy maker to be confident that in asking us for intelligence, he is getting as knowledgeable, pertinent, unbiased, and up-to-date a presentation as it is possible to provide.

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ON WARNING\*

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The capabilities of U.S. intelligence have improved markedly in the course of the last fifteen years or so, but in the same period expectations about what it ought to be able to accomplish have probably grown even faster. This is natural enough, and probably professionally salutatory for those who ply the trade, since most people need demanding requirements to keep them up to the mark. In any case, the government spends a great deal of money to equip itself with good intelligence and is rightly impatient with anything less than the best. But the situation does carry irritations and hazards for the professional. It is comparable to that in modern medicine, wherein improvement in techniques and medications, by giving rise to anticipation of consistent success, makes occasional failure a doubly grievous matter.

And by some standards intelligence fails more than occasionally, since it is considered in many quarters to have fallen down on the job if there takes place anywhere in the world an important, or sometimes even mildly interesting, political event which it had not heralded in advance in a way to make the warning stick in the minds of its consumers. We are all familiar with the queries and the resulting search of the record to find out whether top officials had been warned of such and such a development prior to its occurrence, and if not why. The short answer is often that these officials had indeed been warned, sometimes repeatedly, but won't admit it. This is the one likely to jump to the tongue of the participant in the post mortem, whether intelligence collector, analyst, or estimator: he had reported a week or month ago that coup plotting was afoot in Ruritania and the government's position was shaky, so nobody should have been surprised when it was thrown out last night.

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\* Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Winter 1965), pp. 15-21.

25X1A \*\* [redacted] is a member of the Board of National Estimates.

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Whether or not anyone should have been surprised, however, the fact is that they often enough were surprised, and so inclined to ask why. Except in a narrow and not very profitable way, the analyst or estimator cannot meet the question by pointing out that an estimate or a current intelligence daily "covered" yesterday's big event when it noted weeks or months ago the possibility of a coup in Ruritania. Too often that report has been forgotten in the intervening stream of intelligence issuances and other papers or their equivalent in briefing sessions. Unless the consumer has been informed recently, and with sufficient emphasis and impact to make it stick, he has not in an effective sense been warned.

The following observations on this subject are intended neither as a defense of the intelligence community's record nor as definitive analysis and solution of the difficulty. The problem of crisis anticipation and early warning will continue with us, I suspect, despite the recurrent efforts of this computer age to gear machines for effective and reliable prophecy in these soft areas of intelligence; here art, old-fashioned expertise, and a judicious amount of imagination still count for more than science. But while these reflections can offer no new secret insights or intellectual breakthrough, it may nonetheless be useful in a professional journal to record some guidelines and techniques derived from experience in asking the questions, if not always giving the right answers.

#### Varium et Mutabile

The obvious first consideration is that the world itself is a chancey and uncertain place, in which change, sudden or gradual, is more the rule than the exception. One need only compare the world today, or any area of it, with what prevailed 10 years ago to get a measure of the flux we live in. Technology, altering the lives and the thinking of men everywhere, has been accelerating the pace of even the most massive historical trends, the kind that used to take decades to work themselves out. To take one conspicuous example: with some stretching of the historical imagination one can imagine a colonial revolt against imperialism getting under way a century ago and gaining wide support in various parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but one can scarcely picture such a movement winning hands down, but for a few isolated spots, in little more than a decade. Yet this is what happened in the last 15 years, and the accompanying turbulence has generated some of the principal problems for U.S. foreign policy and intelligence during most of our official careers.

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In this world and this period of history, the intelligence analyst and his customers are going to be nearer the mark if they think of change as more or less constant, and the main question as being not whether but when and how it will manifest itself. Unless proven otherwise, it should be assumed that a given society is changing daily. We face a semantic pitfall in the possibility of inferring from the overworked term "stable" or "stability" that things are remaining static; this attribute is often ascribed to a kind of mere surface calm below which change and flux are going on all the time.

If accepting the fact that change is normal and widespread predisposes us favorably, it still does not begin to solve the problems arising from what we have to work with in forecasting a particular change. In most cases the raw material of the evidence is necessarily fragmentary and inconclusive, and as it is rounded out it normally becomes not the stuff of early warning but news of current events. A number of things contribute to the poor quality of evidence on future developments.

One is the sheer impossibility of keeping track of the moves of every individual, organization, or government that may be in a position to change things in some part of the world. This difficulty is compounded when the success of the move for change depends on the ability of the promoters to keep it secret. If the coup plan that gets leaked is the one most likely to be frustrated by its enemies, it follows that a lot of such impending moves that have been reported either do not come off or go quite differently than anticipated. No one in the early-warning business can afford to overlook such reports in his own calculations, but some of them are going to prove ill founded by reason of the same lack of secrecy that led to our getting them.

There is also the intrinsic element of caprice in the affairs of men and nations. Some events cannot be predicted because the principals seize sudden opportunities to act or are reacting to sudden stimuli, unforeseen and quite unforeseeable by those on the spot. If the participants themselves could not have predicted the turn of events, the most sensitive and pervasive intelligence systems would not be likely to do better. It is probably a salutary sign of awareness of such limitations that the unanticipated fall of Khrushchev was not followed, at least to my knowledge, by stern admonitions to the intelligence community to reform its procedures and sharpen its sense of urgency.

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Shotgun and Pinpoint

For those charged with intelligence warning there is of course a simple and appealing solution to these dilemmas--to point the gun in all possible directions. Warning always of everything gives you a technical defense against the charge that you failed to provide warning; it is also likely to lose you most of your readers or listeners and beat the remainder into a state of permanent hysteria or hopeless apathy. It is doubtful that anyone could be got to read an estimate or current intelligence paper big and fat enough to cover all the dire possibilities, and it is certain that the inflationary effect of this course on the value of intelligence warning would be ruinous.

A cardinal principle of effective warning intelligence, then, has to be selectivity. Selectivity involves rejection, and rejection involves risk. If intelligence is to eschew the shotgun approach in the interests of being read and respected, it will have to pick from the voluminous mass of often fragmentary and sometimes contradictory data a limited number of items to pass along, and sometimes what it rejects will later prove to be important. The hope is that the error will be corrected in time by the receipt of information supplementing or shedding new light on the rejected item and so promoting it out of the rejection category. Or perhaps another, better or luckier human mind will encounter the same fragment of information and respond more sensitively and perceptively--hopefully well in advance of the event it foreshadows. In the best of circumstances, however, selection will occasionally eliminate something that subsequently proves to have been important stuff. It is the argument of this essay that an occasional miss of this type is preferable to the overprudent shotgun alternative.

Criteria: Likelihood

Now even a highly selective warning system will have to deal in possibilities more often than in probabilities or near-certainties. Reasonable prudence requires that a government be prepared, at any given moment, to cope or at least live with a number of contingent possibilities only some of which will in fact materialize. If something could happen, it had better be borne in mind, whether it will "probably" happen or not. This being the case, some fairly substantial proportion of the warnings delivered will in the event prove exaggerated or will otherwise not be borne out by subsequent developments. (Sometimes the fact that a warned-of development fails to come off may be due to U.S. action triggered by the warning; here intelligence has done its job to perfection even if its prophesies fail to come true.)

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Errors on the side of caution are less harmful than neglect of warning, but they are not harmless. A false alarm will normally be overlooked or forgiven much more easily than a failure to call the shot on something that does happen; but both are errors and both ought to be on the consciences of those in the warning business. Most of us recall with acute pain instances in which intelligence failed to forecast something that did occur. A review of the dangers and opportunities warned of that did not materialize may give less pain but is still sobering.

#### Importance

The area between these two kinds of error thus represent one of the criteria in the process of selection--degree of likelihood. The standard is admittedly a fuzzy one. A second criterion offers somewhat solid ground, namely the importance of the matter being warned of. It is often, though not always, easier to judge how significantly some contingency would affect our interests than how likely it is to occur. Common sense and a reasonable familiarity with the scope of our government's interests and activities usually enables us to tell whether some foreseeable event would be of critical, great, moderate, little, or no importance to national or departmental interests. In any case the policy makers' judgment on this score can supplement our own.

The complexity and many responsibilities of a government like ours suggest that very few foreign developments would fail to be of concern to some department or program. As a criterion for warning selection, then, the question of importance probably refers less to whether than to whom to warn and how. Some predictions should have top billing in national intelligence publications or briefings, others more subdued treatment in departmental or specialized issuances. The criterion is thus most usefully relevant to selection for briefings and publication at the highest levels.

It is this writer's subjective and purely personal opinion that the application of more vigorous standards in this respect would have a salutary effect on the bulk and readability, and hence on the impact, of most intelligence publications, not excluding the national estimates. An urge for completeness and detailed perfection is a good thing, but sometimes an inordinate amount of time and energy is spent in perfecting presentations of detail which can make no earthly difference to policy decisions but confront already overburdened readers with more information than they want or need to know. This is not an argument for either carelessness or superfinality but a plea for the classic virtues of brevity and concentration on the essential as still useful in our line of work.

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Imminence

The criteria of likelihood and importance for determining whether, how, and to whom to give early warning are supplemented by a third, that of imminence, which is most relevant to the choice of when to warn. This timing is often of critical importance, for policy makers are as human as the rest of us and busier than most. On the higher levels they are subjected to a mentally exhausting barrage of publications and briefings on a host of subjects, and in the daily round of attending to inescapably urgent things, some of the rest are going to be remembered and some are not.

Selection in the light of imminence is a matter of avoiding unacceptable extremes, warning too early or too late. Logically it might seem the earlier the better, giving as much time as possible to do something about it, but this logic leads to presenting a catalog of all kinds of important things that may or are likely to happen eventually. Though it is unquestionably desirable to look ahead, in appropriate context, with a general prediction of developments that seem ultimately probable, our problem here is a pointed particular warning at a time when something can and should be done about it.

Even the most prudent and forward-looking administration cannot give as serious attention to a problem foreseen five years ahead as to one shaping up next week. It is not just that something postponable is crowded off the stage by real and present dangers; there is often little that can or should be done about some foreseen events until they are closer at hand. There is always the chance that the contingency will not arise when expected or not at all.

It is true that in addition to delivering specific warning at the right time, intelligence has a responsibility to keep its consumers sufficiently aware of the remoter contingencies, of what Walt W. Rostow recently described as "the relevance of the less obvious."\* It has to do this without dulling their senses or straining their patience with frequent laundry lists of all imaginable horrors. I confess it is much easier to state this problem than to offer any but the most banal answers. One line of procedure, however, while more the result of evolution in the art of

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\* In a lecture on "The Planning of Foreign Policy," given at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University and published in The Dimensions of Diplomacy (E.A. Johnson, ed., Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1964).

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policy making than of intelligence innovation, does offer the intelligence officer some help. I refer to the increased emphasis in recent years on isolating and studying very long-range policy problems--issues of a sort which may not require U.S. counter action for several years to come. It may be debated whether the policy lines worked out in these exercises will in most cases be followed when the moment for action comes--certainly it will not be just a matter of lifting a ready-made "courses of action" formula out of the files--but the long lead-time concept is salutary for policy planning, and its acceptance makes the job of intelligence warning a few degrees easier and conceivably a bit more fruitful. In an uncertain world perhaps we can't ask for much more.

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## POLICY BIAS\*

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The question of the extent to which the U.S. intelligence assessment of foreign situations is biased by already established government policy toward them is a delicate one and in all its ramifications too complex to be broached by a junior trainee like the present writer. But any student with access to the materials can sample one aspect of it by separating off a particular fairly clear situation and examining the community's finished reports on it for signs that their objectivity has been impaired by the policy makers' views. This is what I have done, taking as sample the National Estimates, articles in CIA's Current Intelligence Weekly, and State's INR publications concerned with the situation in Portuguese Angola over a period of about two years.

Here the established U.S. policy, first publicly declared by Ambassador Stevenson in the United Nations in March 1961, is one of support for Angolan self-determination and of opposition to Portugal's resolve to keep the colony, which was legally declared a "province" in 1951. Evidence that the finished intelligence reports had been affected by this policy was found in their phrasing and emphasis, in their omission of facts reported from the field (by the U.S. [redacted] attaches, the American consul in Luanda, and the clandestine services) which could be cited in favor of the opposing Portuguese policy, and in their measurement of Portuguese performance against standards set up by the U.S. policy. In these respects the National Estimates showed the least anti-Portuguese bias, the INR publications the most.

\* Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter 1963), pp. 55-59.

\*\* [redacted] is a junior officer trainee in CIA.

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### National Estimates

Although the four estimates between 1959 and 1962 which treated the subject of Portugal's overseas territories seem to be for the most part objective, they do contain a few manifestations of bias. In an NIE of 21 July 1959, it is said that

Portuguese policy is a curious mixture of indifference to the lot of the native, half-hearted efforts to elevate him from savagery, repression of all dissident voices, and cheerful assertion that in fact no problems exist.

Hyperbole and ridicule of this kind are clearly inconsistent with objectivity. It is possible, however, since the estimate antedates the public declaration of U.S. policy, that this is an instance of personal rather than policy bias.

An NIE of 11 April 1961 estimates that Salazar

may take some measures designed to give the impression of liberalizing the colonial regime.

This statement implies, first, that no measures of reform had theretofore been taken, and second, that any reforms in the future would be made only in order to influence world opinion. But reports from the field show that some reform measures had already been taken and that currently schools for Africans are being built rapidly and public health facilities greatly expanded and improved. It seems clear that the Portuguese have concluded, whether reluctantly or not, that reforms must be made if they are to stay in Angola; and they are determined to stay. Given their lack of resources and the conservatism of the government at home and in Angola, it is not surprising that the reforms are neither sweeping nor rapid. But it is unrealistic to assume that what measures are being taken are designed only to impress international opinion. The Portuguese have never been terribly concerned by adverse public opinion before, and it is unlikely that they would now base their policy on it.

Several passages in the estimates also leave an exaggerated impression of the "rigid, harsh, and penurious" conditions under which the average Angolan lives. Conditions in Angola are far from utopian for the African, but the field reports supply evidence that they are not so bad as generally believed. This evidence is not presented in the NIE's. On the other hand, it was only in an NIE, of all the finished reports, that a reference was found to the "unusual cruelty on both sides" in the rebellion.

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Many of the estimates' conclusions were the same as those which have been reached by U.S. policy makers--that the Portuguese are likely to have continuing troubles in Angola, for example, and that reform will have to be considerable if the situation is not to become explosive. One cannot say whether this is because policy influenced intelligence, because intelligence influenced policy, as it should, or because the evidence led both independently to the same conclusions.

#### Current Intelligence Weeklies

Examining seventeen articles in the Weekly from May 1960 to April 1962 covering the Angolan situation, I found no evidence of a lack of objectivity prior to the U.S. declaration of policy, but beginning in April 1961 there was a prejudicial omission of mitigating material contained in the field reports. In these articles there are several references to "brutal repression" on the part of the Portuguese armed services and civilians. According to reports from State and Army personnel on the scene, the attacks of the African terrorists have been equally brutal. For example, one State despatch said that Africans were "killing white families, mulatto families and native Africans who had not joined their movement with equal and impartial brutality." Reports of African brutality have also appeared in the New York Times. This the Weeklies do not mention anywhere, leaving the impression that there was no provocation whatever for the Portuguese reprisals.

There is also considerable discrepancy between the articles and field reports with regard to the extent of Portuguese brutality. In the panicky month following the uprising, according to the latter, there were indeed indiscriminate acts of cruelty and reprisal on the part of the Portuguese authorities and civilians in Angola, and some groups of innocent Africans were killed or driven from their homes in both official and vigilante-type actions. The reports go on to say, however, that since the Portuguese army moved into Angola in force there have been only isolated instances of such reprisals. The army officers in the north, feeling that the natives in that area had some reason for revolt, have instituted a policy of "psychological rehabilitation." They are laying out new villages where they can protect the natives, assisting in the construction of homes and schools, and encouraging rebels and refugees to return to their homes with no punishment. The civilian Portuguese often regard all Africans as rebels or potential rebels, but the army discourages this view and is trying to avoid indiscriminate acts of violence. The Weekly articles do not mention this effort of the Portuguese army to deal with the situation;

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they make no distinction between military and civilian actions. They also do not mention the statements in field reports that Portuguese retaliation and cruelty have been greatly exaggerated.

#### INR Publications

Although the INR publications carry a caveat that they do not necessarily reflect Department of State policy, the two Research Memoranda and the one longer Intelligence Report covering the rebellion in Angola do seem to have been written in support of policy. One of the Research Memoranda begins by setting up the standard,

The U.S. had hoped these reforms would set the stage for  
(1) a marked improvement in the status of Africans, and  
(2) eventual self-determination in the provinces.

and then proceeds to measure Portuguese performance against this U.S. "hope," reporting for example that

...the Portuguese seem to have little understanding of, or inclination toward, the positive programs needed to prepare either the African for full participation in modern political or economic life or the overseas provinces for ultimate self-determination.

and concluding that

The rigid attitude of the present government offers no hope that the principle of self-determination will be accepted in the near future.

Thus Portuguese policy is judged in the light of what the U.S. policy maker thinks should be done in Angola. Moreover, the publications openly show their anti-Portuguese bias throughout. They refer continually to "brutal repression" without mentioning the provocation of African terrorism and cite alleged traits of Portuguese national character:

The recently reinforced police, in conjunction with the large military garrisons, can and have suppressed nascent subversive movements with characteristic Portuguese thoroughness and ruthlessness.

They speak of Portuguese reforms with tongue in cheek and point again and again to the disparity between principle and fact in the Angolan society. Disparities are evident, but inless the field reports are all wrong reforms are really being undertaken.

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It is interesting to see the great discrepancy between the reports of the consul in Luanda and the INR publications. The consul is not all-out Portuguese; he is quite critical of many aspects of the policy in Angola. But he also brings out things that show the Portuguese in a favorable light, for example the steps toward economic and educational reform, the good race relations which obtained in Angola until 1961. He stresses his conviction that statements about Portuguese brutality and the extent of rebellion have been greatly exaggerated, a conviction substantiated by reports from the British and American attaches. But these points do not appear in the Department's intelligence publications. They are not explicitly discounted or denied; they are simply ignored.

#### Conclusions

As a trainee, I have been led to believe that intelligence should present and analyze the facts in any situation in as completely objective a way as possible, and further that it should present all of the relevant facts regardless of whether or not they support a given government policy. In varying degrees the publications on the Angolan situation I examined did not live up to this ideal but manifested an anti-Portuguese bias and disregarded information favorable to the Portuguese viewpoint reported from the field. On the basis of the material that was available to me I would therefore conclude that the intelligence community's coverage of the Angolan situation has not been completely objective and has not presented all the relevant facts. If this is true, it raises a serious question in my mind: If policy makers do not receive complete reports and objective estimates from the intelligence community, to whom do they turn for them?

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STYLE AND STEREOTYPES IN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES\*

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Droning monotony, fancy jargon, and Victorian stuffiness in government prose, long the butt of an excessive amount of satire, have again become a favorite target of journalists. A top official of the Department of State acknowledged the vulnerability in a recent speech before a group of career officers in his agency. Pointing out his concern over the abstruse style used in the reports which he received, he made a plea for the revival of the straightforward "declarative sentence" and for direct expression of ideas.

In this wave of public baiting intelligence writing has not been singled out for special attention, for the obvious reason that it is classified, has limited distribution, and does meet a high standard. On the other hand, it has certainly not escaped periodic jibes, often justified, from intelligence writers and editors and from the recipients of their products.

A truism about any form of communication is that effectiveness depends on not only what is said but how it is said. Format and style are perhaps even more important in intelligence than in most forms of writing. A keen analysis of any given event or development can be mangled in the process of presentation, for example by burying the critical portions in superfluous detail. The emphasis on brevity and clarity in intelligence reports implicitly recognizes that the key officials who are of influence in the formation of our foreign and defense policies are under a variety of pressures and demands, that they can devote only a limited part of their time to the great volume of intelligence materials which flow across their desks. Aware of this competition for time and attention, all intelligence producers would like to feel that their efforts are presented as sharply, clearly, and effectively as possible.

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\* Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 1964), pp. A1-5.

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\*\* [redacted], is a current intelligence analyst.

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### Mass Perfection

A uniform style adopted by all producing agencies and for almost all types of intelligence production has been perfected to a degree which may have reached the point of being self-defeating. Extreme uniformity, even in perfection, risks having a deadening effect. Regardless of originator, subject matter, area, or type of study--from reports of coup attempts and general political estimates to specialized economic surveys--finished intelligence is beginning to have a remarkably familiar ring. How necessary is this uniformity?

Intelligence style has had to develop within the strict framework of acceptable official prose and of course is limited by these formal confines. However, since the product is classified and not subject to general scrutiny, it would appear that intelligence components should have at least a little more flexibility of expression than other government bureaus. In addition, it would have been reasonable to assume that the different intelligence agencies and the several staffs for different types of intelligence production--basic, current, estimative, etc.--would have attempted to achieve some degree of individuality, each developing its own style and format. But quite the opposite has happened.

One of the causes of uniformity is the widespread and recurring use of a high percentage of fashionable words and phrases derived from an invisible elite phrase book. Thus intelligence studies are generally chock-full of such words as image, posture, mystique, offload, dialogue, presence--terms currently considered choice in government, journalistic, and academic circles. To borrow a phrase from the sociologists, "cross-fertilization" explains the wide propagation of these terms. All producers are perusing the output of the others and consciously or unconsciously borrowing or plagiarizing from it. This literary osmosis soon becomes a kind of disease which adversely affects good writing.

### The Editorial Compulsion

Not content with the osmotic leveling, editors have exercised their authority to impose an extreme rigidity of style on intelligence publications. Their usual explanation to the writer is that the next echelon of editors will perform even more drastic surgery on a manuscript if it is not carried out at the initial stage. Other rationalizations for manuscript changes go something like this: "We just don't use this word (or phrase)." "This is inappropriate to our style." Or "the chief simply writhes in anger whenever he

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sees this word." Most frequently, however, editors make changes in the interest of "the reader" (aka "consumer"). The editor smooths the ruffled feelings of the analyst in the following terms: "The reader will see a double meaning in this idea." "The reader won't understand the terminology in this context." "The reader will infer such-and-such from this paragraph." The clairvoyance of editors with respect to the thoughts and reactions of this lone reader is nothing less than preternatural. Embarrassingly, however, their psychic or telepathic finds are occasionally reversed by the higher editorial echelon, which not infrequently restores the analyst's original phrasing or something like it.

No one would deny that intelligence production of all types requires a closely controlled style and format in order to fulfill its purposes. Considerable uniformity is inevitable, in part because of the pressures of deadlines and the variance in writing skills among analysts. If the latter were unleashed to give expression to their personalities in their reports, chaos would soon reign and the reputation of the producing component be ruined. Some stereotyping, moreover, is necessarily introduced by the primary additive of finished intelligence--interpretation, estimates, analysis, meaning. These cannot be couched in absolutes, and the English language has just so many synonyms to qualify unknowns and signal the difference between fact, reported fact, and significance. The words possibly, probably, likely, unlikely, may be, seem, almost certainly, according to, presumably, allegedly, ostensibly, believed to be, and a few others are bound to recur in intelligence writing. They are accepted as indispensable guides and warnings.

But there still remains a small degree of indeterminism in the relatively rigid framework of both style and format. And this small bit of leeway could provide a refreshing breath of variety in intelligence presentation, sharpening the interest and receptivity of the reader. For example, editors might lower the bars slightly to permit the occasional passage of sentences beginning with "But" or "And," a form of sentence structure widely approved in the best grammatical circles and highly effective when used sparingly. Or a single striking phrase without a predicate. The granting of such small liberties might encourage initiative and originality among analysts who otherwise tend to feel too hopelessly tethered by editorial regulations. Too often an analyst will excuse a perfunctory job of writing and organization on the ground that "the editors will rewrite the piece anyway, so why waste my time on anything but the content?" A greater flexibility in presentation than may be possible for periodic reporting under short deadlines would be feasible for special studies and memoranda which develop a subject in depth and detail and at greater leisure. An occasional sampling of consumer opinion could serve as a guide.

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The Elegant Cliche

It is always easier to take negative action, and one eminently practicable means of improving intelligence presentation and at the same time eliminating some of its sameness requires only a negative action on the part of editors and analysts--the elimination of as many as possible of the popular cliches that saturate the content of most government and journalistic reporting. Clarity, accuracy, brevity, and directness are among the cardinal qualities of intelligence writing and indeed of any good non-fiction. These characteristics should not be confused with the excessive and often contrived introduction of terms once pungent and effective which through overuse has become a mere jargon, perpetuated to give the sophisticated a feeling of "belonging" and "togetherness." Shopworn pretentious phraseology can be distracting if not actually repelling to a reader.

For example, image, posture, presence, and confrontation. The flexible word "situation" should not be made a cover for all sins; it is often superfluous embroidery. A recent government publication mentioned "the fat cow surplus situation" in a particular foreign area; did the surplus of fat cows have to be a situation? And are we really being more sophisticated in saying that a cargo is "onloaded" or "offloaded?" The English-speaking peoples survived for many centuries with plain-vanilla load and unload, and I have yet to get through my obtuse skull the advantage in the new coinage.

The following is a small sampling of currently fashionable cliches, listed for handy reference of analysts and editors. All of them are recommended for the most "Limited Official Use" to which it is possible to limit them.

## NOUNS AND PHRASES

## VERB FORMS

image  
posture  
presence  
mystique  
confrontation  
situation  
structure  
infrastructure  
dialogue  
on balance  
political infighting  
dichotomy  
thrust (of an argument)  
take-off stage (a program  
or economy)

to play in low key  
to stem from  
to structure  
to restructure  
to onload  
to offload  
to move forward  
to kick off (a political  
campaign, program)  
to trigger  
to step up  
to add a new dimension  
to back-stop

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Finally, the editors might to advantage dispense with the term "the reader" when defending their changes during confrontations with analysts. The implication of this word in the singular--an audience of only one--is wilting of the analyst's posture and has an adverse impact on the projection of his image. Besides, analysts always speak of editors in the plural, because there always seem to be several echelons. Since the analyst is guaranteed at least so many readers, the plural form--on balance--would appear to be good usage in the editorial dialogue.

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## THE MONITORING OF WAR INDICATORS\*

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To provide warning of any surprise attack against the United States and its allies is our first national intelligence objective, but one, it has been our experience, that cannot be adequately served by the normal processes of estimative or current intelligence. We have therefore found it necessary to develop a somewhat specialized intelligence effort for advanced strategic early warning. This effort, which we have termed "indications intelligence," seeks to discern in advance any Soviet or other Communist intent to initiate hostilities, whether against the United States or its forces, its allies or their forces, or areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit. It also seeks to detect and warn of other developments directly susceptible of enemy exploiting action which would jeopardize the security of the United States; and this effort has been extended in practice to any critical situation which might give rise to hostilities, whether or not there is an immediate threat of direct US or Soviet involvement.

We maintain a sharp distinction between this intelligence early warning--a strategic warning in advance of military operations, based on deductive conclusions about Soviet preparations--and operational early warning, tactical conclusions from information on Soviet operations now obtained largely by mechanical means. I like to think of the indications activity as having four aspects:

First, it is the cultivation of a mental attitude which leads to first assessment of all Soviet or Communist action in terms of preparation for early hostilities.

Second, it is the development of a body of doctrine which can serve as guidance for the collection of warning information, for its physical handling, and for its evaluation. Basically this is the iso-

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\* Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 1959), pp. 55-68.

\*\* [ ] is one of the pioneers of Indications Intelligence.

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lation of those actions which would be most likely to constitute preparations for hostilities, whether deliberate or in response to the immediate international situation. It is the creation, through experience, of a body of "common law" applicable to the selection, evaluation and analysis of information pertinent to warning.

Third, it is the development of new techniques and methods for the collection, processing, evaluation, and analysis of information significant principally or solely for purposes of strategic early warning. These techniques and methods range from finding new sources to analysis by electronic devices. With the development of missiles and the consequent sharp reduction in the time lag between an enemy decision to attack and the attack, we must give this aspect of the activity increased attention. The alternative would be a degree of abdication by intelligence to "operations," with a consequent loss to national flexibility.

Fourth, it is the organization of the intelligence community at all levels so that it can process most rapidly and effectively information from every source which could provide insight into Soviet preparation for hostilities. This processing involves every step from initial screening, or even collection, to the reporting of conclusions to responsible officials of the executive arm of the government. This continuous process is an integral part of, and yet different from, the current intelligence and estimative processes. When a threat appears great, as in moments of considerable crisis, the indications process tends to coalesce with both the current intelligence process and the estimative process, at least at the national level.

Before treating these aspects in detail I shall outline the organization and procedures for advanced strategic warning which have evolved in the United States. Far from perfected and still evolving as they are, they will at least illustrate one national effort to provide intelligence indications of threatening war.

#### The Watchers and Their Work-Week

The Director of Central Intelligence and the US Intelligence Board, who have the ultimate national responsibility for this warning, have in effect delegated the function to the USIB Watch Committee. The Watch Committee is composed of senior intelligence officers at the general officer or senior colonel level representing the major intelligence agencies, and is chaired by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Although it meets only weekly during

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normal times, or perhaps daily during crises, its function is continuous, exercised through frequent liaison and contact and through a constant routine exchange of information and evaluations, formal or informal.

Serving the Committee is a permanent staff in the National Indications Center, the physical locus of Committee functions. The NIC staff of 25 is composed of intelligence officers at the colonel or naval captain level representing each of the major intelligence agencies, assisted by administrative, communications, and graphics personnel. The Center itself is linked by electrical communications to the major agencies. It receives from the USIB agencies a flow of possible indications information, both on a routine across-the-board basis and as evaluated and selected for possible pertinence. It has a 24-hour intelligence duty officer who is in frequent contact with duty officers in other agencies and with members of the staff. Through these contacts and communication links there is a constant interchange of information and views, but formally the Watch Committee functions on a weekly cycle which can be telescoped during crises to a matter of minutes. The cycle is rather elaborate, and while imperfect it at least aims at thoroughness. It runs roughly as follows:

Friday to Monday noon: Screening and processing information, in the NIC and in each member agency.

Monday afternoon: The NIC staff reviews available information, compiles a preliminary agenda for the Wednesday Watch Committee meeting, and teletypes it to member agencies.

Tuesday: "Pre-watch" meetings in each member agency, attended also by NIC staff members, at which available information is reviewed and selected for the Watch Committee meeting. Final agenda and graphics are prepared in the NIC.

Wednesday morning: Watch Committee meeting. All intelligence and operational information considered pertinent and its interpretation is reviewed, orally and graphically, in a two-to-three-hour session. The Committee drafts its conclusions at the table.

Afternoon: Watch Committee members check its conclusions individually with USIB members. The conclusions, when coordinated through the medium of the NIC, are then published as USIB views and transmitted to responsible government officials and other recipients around the world. NIC prepares the draft body of the Watch Report, a summarization of the evidence considered by the Committee, and sends it by courier or teletype to USIB member agencies.

Thursday morning: The draft Watch Report is reviewed, updated, and commented on by USIB members and by responsible analysts at the desk level in all major agencies.

Afternoon: The NIC staff, on the basis of agency comments, prepares a final draft report and submits it to USIB members for approval.

Friday morning: The printed report is disseminated to all recipients; all concerned breathe deeply and plunge into the cycle again.

This fairly exhaustive procedure is complex, sometimes ponderous and time-consuming. But in addition to the production of the formal Committee reports, it has served another very important purpose: it has accustomed all those involved to the joint hammering-out of all the issues, including minor or particular ones. This means that when time is pressing and the issues really urgent we can arrive at joint evaluations and conclusions very quickly. Upon occasion a Committee conclusion has been passed to the White House less than an hour after the Committee was summoned to meet.

Within most of our agencies, the normal internal intelligence processes and organizations are relied on to flush out and evaluate the information which is passed to the NIC or utilized by Watch Committee members at their meetings. Several agencies, however, maintain small internal groups whose sole function is to screen out warning information and seek or stimulate evaluations of it. They are parallel pieces, by way of insurance, to the normal internal intelligence organization and process. In Air Force, for example, a 24-hour indications center is maintained to serve USAF Headquarters and to act as central for a net of small indications centers in the major geographical air commands.

Each of our major joint military commands outside the continental United States has a replica of the national Watch Committee. These are responsible to the theater joint commander, but forward their reports to Washington, where they are regularly considered by the Watch Committee. Thus in our national intelligence warning process the Watch Committee cycle has its concurrent parallels abroad dealing similarly with local warning problems. In some instances the timing of the process abroad has been adjusted to that of the Watch Committee.

With these mechanics as a background, I return to the four aspects of indications intelligence which I mentioned earlier: mental attitude, doctrine, the development of techniques, and organization.



My remarks constitute an amalgam of the experience and ideas of a small number of us who have worked in indications intelligence for some years. Some of these ideas have yet to be adopted throughout our community, but our experience leads us to believe that in time they may be more widely accepted.

#### Attitude of the Watcher

Ideally, for the purposes of indications intelligence, some or all of the following assumptions must be made as basic working hypotheses, though each can be legitimately challenged in any given situation:

The Soviets, together with the other Communist states, are seeking an opportune time to initiate hostilities to achieve their ends.

The attack will attempt maximum surprise, possibly during periods of international calm.

The decision to initiate hostilities may be made without the military capability which we would consider requisite.

Any estimates which argue from other assumptions may be quite wrong.

If intelligence officers dealing at any stage with potential warning information can be conditioned to these assumptions, we feel that we have a greater chance of detecting that pattern of developments which may attend preparations for an attack. Intelligence officers need not be ruled by these assumptions, but they should be conscious of them when any possibly relevant information is considered: for instance, military exercises should always be considered as deployments and as changes in degree of military readiness or as rehearsals for an impending attack.

We must instill and maintain this attitude in all personnel dealing with potential warning information, particularly during non-critical periods or during the fading days of a crisis. This is a difficult task, especially in a large intelligence organization with a high degree of specialization and compartmentalization. There are two obvious alternative ways of going about it. One is to wage a relentless educational campaign among the body of our intelligence personnel. This method faces some of the obstacles of a highway safety campaign or a campaign against sin; and it is possible that in laying extensive general stress on the warning problem we might overdo it and give rise to unbalanced or unduly alarmist intelligence reporting and estimates.

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The other approach, which I favor, is to develop a small group of indications intelligence officers, either working together as a body or spread among various organizations but maintaining close contact. Such officers would consider information from the warning point of view only, would provide continuity in the development of doctrine, would serve as missionaries among both collectors and analysts, and would keep pressing for adequate attention to fragmentary information of potential but not necessarily apparent significance to warning. Such officers need not achieve great depth in any regional or functional intelligence field, since they could rely on experts for the necessary support. It has been our experience that intelligence officers given this responsibility become enthusiasts, if not zealots, of the indications hunt, and extremely sensitive to those visceral signals which in the last analysis may well be the vital factor in our judgment as to the imminence of a Soviet attack.

In the United States several intelligence agencies have made use of this approach to a greater or less degree. Others depend largely upon having their representatives in our National Indications Center and upon the fact that our major joint current intelligence committee, the Watch Committee, focuses on indications of hostilities and does not spread its consideration to all matters of general intelligence significance. Although it might appear that this specialization could develop a predisposition to a too-frequent crying of "wolf," we feel that the joint nature of the considerations which precede the forwarding of our warnings tends to preclude the danger. In practice, we have found that the nature of our system has served to reduce the number of alarmist "flaps" which arise, particularly outside intelligence circles, from undeliberated interpretation of developments.

#### Doctrine of the Watch

In the development of a doctrine to guide and assist us to provide warning of an attack, we have sought first to identify in advance those actions which would constitute preparations for hostilities. Such pre-identifications, useful to both analysts and collectors, we have compiled into Indicator Lists. An indicator we define as a major action which the Soviets must take before they are ready for hostilities, whereas an indication is evidence that such an action is being or has been taken. The distinction is an essential one which all of us tend to lose sight of in common usage.

In isolating those actions which we designate as indicators or potential indicators, we are seeking answers to several key questions:

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What are the essential steps the Soviets and their allies must take in their preparation for early major hostilities?

Which of these steps represent a degree of national commitment which would only, or most likely, follow their decision to initiate hostilities?

In the light of the nature of information currently available to us, or which can be expected, what sort of information will we accept as evidence that these preparatory or implementing steps are being taken?

How do we distinguish, during periods of crisis, between those actions which are precautionary and those which are preparations for deliberate hostilities?

What actions constitute evidence that the Soviet decision-making process is in action, possibly considering the question of hostilities?

We have attempted to distinguish a series of preparation phrases representing progressive steps toward a decision to attack or progressive commitment of the enemy state to war. We group the indicators in four such stages as follows:


Long range: Actions involved in the intensified achievement of specific military capabilities, offensive or defensive, essential to the prosecution of general hostilities which are either generally anticipated or deliberately planned.

Medium Range: Actions or developments which might accompany or follow a decision to ready the nation or the military forces generally for any eventuality, or which might follow a deliberate decision for war but precede formulation, issuance or implementation of specific operational plans and orders.

Short Range: Actions which might follow or accompany the alerting and/or positioning of forces for specific attack operations or to meet an estimated possible US attack.

Immediate or Very Short Range: Actions which might accompany or immediately precede a Soviet attack (frequently combined in practice with the preceding stage).

These stages can, and have been, defined at greater length or quite differently, but the purpose is the same--to arrive at a listing which groups at one end those actions which may represent



long-range preparations for hostilities, but not necessarily a commitment to them, and at the other end those actions which, by their urgency and costliness, appear to connote a commitment of the enemy state to war. It also gives us a sensing of the imminence associated with such indications as we may detect, and of the phasing in time among them.

In our listings we attempt to give not only the major actions which constitute indicators, but also some of the contributory indicators which, if noted in concert, would comprise evidence of a major indication otherwise undetected. Our phased approach also serves to isolate actions by which we hope to gauge the extent and danger of Communist reaction to a particular, perhaps seemingly localized, crisis.

Our proposed schedule of lists will include:

First, a general indicator list stating in broad terms the major actions we would expect.

Second, a series of functional lists in much greater detail. There will be separate lists for Long Range Air Force preparations, ground force preparations, political and diplomatic activities, clandestine activities, civil defense, military medicine, weather service, etc.

Third, a series of lists which address themselves to specialized sources, including technical sources. These lists, in effect, are an application of the preceding lists to information provided by individual sources, particularly to changes in a routine take whose warning significance might not be immediately apparent. One such list addresses itself to monitored changes in the conduct of Soviet broadcasting. Another might concern radar monitoring. Another would cover observations our embassy personnel in Moscow might make in the normal course of their daily routine: closure of some subway stations, for example, and an absence of fire engines from normal stations might provide confirmation for suspicions that late-stage civil defense preparations were under way. A similar list for legal rail travelers would include actions observable from a train window which might fit into indicator patterns.

Fourth, a series of target lists naming those installations or outfits by whom or at which certain activity would be of major significance, and those by whom or at which any activity would have major significance. Examples of the latter might be an elite Long Range Air Force unit or an air transport unit suspected of a role limited to the ferrying of nuclear "pills" to operational commands.



This is an ambitious program, reflecting primarily the paucity of available information, particularly information on the major instruments of Soviet attack. When completed, it will be a massive document. We also plan, however, a highly condensed one-sheet version of each list, perhaps in tabular form.

Such lists must be looked on only as guides, and quite often they rapidly become obsolete. In some instances we have failed to come up with anything really satisfactory--most notably in the missile field. But when we have had sufficient experience with our own missiles and with information on Soviet missile operations, we expect to be able to list actions which would serve to indicate the operational readying of the Soviet missile system.

Another aspect of doctrine is formulation of the answers to these questions:

How early, or at what stage, and how often in a given situation do we inform officials of the executive arm of the government?

What general criteria do we use to determine that a warning situation exists?

Our first premise is that we should provide executive officials with the earliest warning possible. This means, in effect, a progressive series of warnings--from a generalized one, perhaps conveying only our sense of uneasiness, through a contingent one pointing out that if certain further actions take place it may be that hostilities are imminent, to an unconditional one conveying our conviction that an attack is forthcoming.

The criteria of a warning situation lie in patterns, in configurations of Soviet or Communist activity which might be consistent with some stage in preparations for early war. Once an apparent pattern is detected, giving an indications situation although not necessarily an alert situation, the hypothetical patterns we have constructed in the preparation of our indicator lists suggest further developments to look for. If information on such developments is subsequently received, we have then progressed toward an alert situation.

When we note apparent patterns of preparation we alert our field collection, particularly to our need for information on major indicators. When we receive information on the accomplishments of one or more isolated major indicators, we also alert the field, this time to our need for information on those other indicators we might expect to see patterned with them. In both instances we feel that we have the basis for some form of warning to the govern-

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ment, even though we may have no conviction that a pre-war situation exists.

The pattern approach is particularly applicable to the surprise attack; it has limitations in situations of localized tension, where the buildup for a limited attack may be as complete as it will ever be, but where there may have been no political decision to make the attack. The indications effort may suggest refinements in our collection, and it may assist in narrowing the field we must search in order to detect evidence of the decision; but it cannot go a great deal further. Subsequent developments are sometimes almost exclusively matter for tactical or operational intelligence. Indications intelligence is looked to, however, for warning of preparations to broaden a localized situation or to cope with an expected broadening.

#### Techniques and New Techniques

Our attempt to develop techniques has thus far been aimed at facilitating the processing and analysis of information and the detection of patterns, and at exposing areas requiring further analytical investigation or more extensive collection efforts. We have used extensively the more orthodox methods, although despite their usefulness we have had to abandon some because of their expense in time and personnel. To describe a few:

Card files of information extracted only for apparent or potential indications significance--one item to a card in three separate files, according to functional fields, date, and the apparent axis or targets of Soviet/Communist attack.

Running lists constituting highly condensed summaries of apparently significant developments arranged according to the apparent axis of attack.

"Shelf-paper" rolls of charts with summarized information of apparent indications significance entered according to date of activity, area and functional field, or in other arrangements.

Highly condensed summaries of apparent current indications, negative and positive, bearing on particular situations.

Quarterly summaries of indications, including only selected developments of apparent medium or long-range significance.

There have also been efforts, some only experimental, at posting developments on display charts or boards categorized variously

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according to area, functional field, date of activity, and degree of imminence or hypothetical length of pre-attack time remaining. Through the use of colors and other devices, such displays serve to call attention to possibilities which need further investigation. The Air Force, which has been the most active among our departments in the development of indicator techniques, devised such an indicator display board for use in all Air Force indication centers and is now experimenting with other graphic means of calling attention to trends and potential warning situations.

There have been a number of suggestions for the use of electronic devices which could store information so coded and weighted that when queried they would respond with a "temperature" reading and a predicted area and time of danger. We have been hesitant to plunge into this sort of thing, because the information fed in would in many cases be so uncertain, and its weighting--which would reflect immediate judgment as to its significance--even more uncertain. I do not believe, however, that we should rule out this approach forever. In many respects, our most important warning information is becoming more and more of a technical nature. It is hard information, such as detection of radar emanations, but difficult to evaluate, analyze and record by our conventional methods. It may be that an imaginative and judicious use of machines will enable us to put information quickly into meaningful patterns which can contribute to our warning.

In developing these techniques we are merely seeking aids to analysis and to presenting the situation. In no sense do we believe that intelligence warning can be performed mechanically, although there are a surprising number of people who believe that this is possible or that it is what we are trying to do.

There is also a need for development of new collection techniques for warning purposes. One thing that can be done is to formulate a coordinated series of collection requirements and reporting directives which would be put into effect only during periods of alert or international crises, when certain types of information would assume new significance. Another is to direct a series of routine monitoring-type missions against selected targets for indications purposes only, with a view to detecting any changes from normal activity. The targets themselves might be of minor importance, but changes in their activities might reflect far more important activities elsewhere. A series of somewhat riskier pre-planned monitoring-type missions could be reserved for periods of alert, when the risks could be justified by the depth of our suspicions.

It may be possible to devise new technical collection systems or adapt some now in use to the purposes of warning intelligence.

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Electronic intelligence, for example, I understand now produces chiefly information on capabilities, new technical developments and order of battle. We must rethink it to see if it can produce unique information on changes in day-to-day activities which would be meaningful to indications intelligence. Early in the development of any new collection device its possibilities for indications intelligence should be examined. This is frequently done far too late.

There is also a need, presumably through communications techniques, for reducing the time lags between collection of information and its effective presentation for evaluation. Our air defense has found it necessary to develop methods for automatic or semi-automatic presentation, and even analysis, of tactical air warning information. But intelligence warning information, although we have been able to cut down actual transmission times for a few highly select messages from field collection points, is too often subject to completely unacceptable, even though understandable, delays.

#### Organizational Devices

I have touched in the foregoing sections on some of the organizational devices introduced in the National Indications Center and member agencies in support of the Watch Committee's function, devices which range from the establishment of the NIC itself and the USIB coordination mechanism to the creation of small parallel indications staffs in individual agencies. I believe that certain other organizational measures might in some form or combination further facilitate our warning efforts. One would be a sort of national directory of intelligence assignments which would locate and fix responsibility for analysis and reporting of potential warning information for every segment of our intelligence coverage, no matter how minor.

Then there might be created a body of collection experts, perhaps even supported by a collection coordination center, which would work in harness with the Watch Committee and the National Indications Center. This might assist, particularly during moments of crisis when time is short, in the coordinated search for missing elements of information or in the rapid clarification of uncertain information.

Finally, we could organize against emergencies a thorough-going phased national intelligence alert, making provision for availability of intelligence personnel, extent of 24-hour staffing, availability of administrative support (including communications), comprehensive

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situation reporting by field collection and by intelligence agencies, and the initiation of pre-planned collection measures such as the assignment of new priorities and targets and the activation of reserve or one-shot sources. Such a total alert would be very difficult to arrange and to keep current, but it could save precious hours.

There is such great change either present or impending in methods of warfare and the balance of power between East and West that the task of providing warning is increasingly difficult. The two major factors in this increasing difficulty are a) the accelerating compression in time between the enemy decision to launch an attack and its launching and between its launching and its delivery, and b) the concurrent reduction in the amount and variety of discernible pre-attack activity. It seems to me that now, as never before, we must subject our intelligence organization and processes for collection and evaluation to continuing scrutiny, and must improve or adapt them to cope with the changing conditions. We must ensure that we are collecting and considering the proper information and that we eliminate every possible delay in the processing of the potentially vital information. Furthermore, in order to provide warning, no matter how contingent, at the earliest possible stage, we must improve our understanding of Soviet Bloc decision-making and strategic doctrine.

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A WATCHMAN FOR ALL SEASONS\*

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Allen W. Dulles in "The Craft of Intelligence" comments: "The cloud in the sky may be no bigger than a man's hand, but it may portend the storm; and it is the duty of intelligence to sound an alarm before a situation reaches crisis proportions."

No intelligence officer is apt to dispute Mr. Dulles' nutshell presentation of problem number one. There are, however, differences in the kinds of interest individual analysts may take in the cloud, depending on their fields of specialization--tactics analysis, current intelligence, strategic warning, and so on through a long list.

There is a degree of overlap among the three fields named both because boundaries are nebulous and because the individual analyst is often expected to don more than one hat. Tactical warning might be described as that which can be obtained by such sensors as the DEW line radars indicating that an attack had actually been initiated. The best-publicized tactical warning in US history occurred in April 1775 when the intelligence apparatus of the patriots sent Paul Revere galloping across the Middlesex countryside.

Strategic warning has been defined to be that which the intelligence community might provide prior to an actual attack, and hopefully while preparations for the attack are still in process. This is the uneasy realm of the warning, or indications analyst. In the nature of the case, therefore, the warning analyst deals in extreme situations. The hypotheses he tests against the evidence tend to stress the outside possibilities. He is interested in what might be. The problem of warning essentially involves the steady contemplation, and sometimes the courageous advocacy of ominous cases. In the trade, these are known as "worst case" situations.

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\* Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Spring 1969), pp. 37-43.

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\*\* [ ] is an indications intelligence officer in CIA's current intelligence organization.

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Some other distinctions can be made. Current intelligence seeks to discern the enemy's actual intentions in the short run. The interests of current intelligence are world-wide while those of warning intelligence--as defined in the intelligence community--are rather limited geographically. The latter is engrossed in "indications of preparations for offensive military action in the immediate future against the United States, its overseas forces or its allies." This is the primary mission of the Watch Committee, the Washington focal point under USIB of strategic intelligence. It has historically been largely limited to the USSR, Communist China, and their allies. In the last decade the Watch Committee has followed developments from time to time in a number of diverse areas peripheral to the Communist blocs such as Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand, the Sino-Indian border, Korea, Cuba and the Middle East. The rationale for following these developments has been that a potential for Communist exploitation existed in the situation which might develop into a threat to the US or its allies.

Indications, or warning intelligence thus may be said to be distinguished from other forms of current intelligence in that its primary interest in enemy behavior is in terms of its threat potential. While indications intelligence is usually co-located with current intelligence, is always dependent on the same information, and is frequently dependent on the current intelligence analyst himself, it does nevertheless view matters from a different perspective. The warning analyst takes incoming scraps, matches them in his mind against an indicator list, and frequently refers back to small nuggets that have long since lost their current intelligence value. The warning analyst may find threat overtones in a pattern of events which might otherwise be considered innocuous if viewed piecemeal.

This is not to suggest that there is some peculiar mystique about the indications process. The indications analyst is, in the writer's view, a current intelligence analyst under instruction to review the same intelligence as others, but, as we have said, from a different perspective. The indications analyst looks at the information for any strategic threat, perhaps only potential, to the US, its forces abroad, or its allies. Other current intelligence analysts are also expected, as one of their duties, to think in terms of indications, but it is the warning analyst's sole obligation to do so.

A hypothetical situation might--in oversimplified terms--illustrate the differing viewpoints. Let us assume that in the 1970's the leadership of Great Frusina (GF)--a mythical nation invented by Sherman Kent--chooses to levy demands in most threatening form on

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the neighboring small country of Outer Riding (OR) to stop the alleged gross discrimination against OR's Frusinian minority. OR has a defense pact with the US.

Current intelligence evaluation of the situation will proceed along several lines. Thus, the political analyst sees the threat as part of the Frusinian leadership's effort to distract and obtain support from dissatisfied groups. The political analyst will question the degrees of support to be expected from allies of the two countries. The economic analyst calculates the length of time it will take for GF to gird its logistic loins for intervention. The military analyst follows closely the number of GF units involved in exercises near OR's border.

The indications analyst, however, might ask himself whether GF was just possibly using the threat of intervention to disguise efforts at a surprise attack on the US. How many of its submarines are operating out of their normal area? What is the state of GF's heavy bombers? Are there any unusual steps being taken in the civil defense field, such as art treasures being crated and moved out of town in case of a retaliatory attack, keeping in mind that OR has no heavy bombers or missiles that could reach the Great Frusinian capital city?

Hypothetically and ideally the warning analyst should be able to rack up all his indicators, both positive and negative, and produce a rough assessment as to how ready GF may be to launch an attack.

In reality, reading the warning tea leaves is not all that clear or easy. Except in the unlikely event of our having direct access to policy-making circles in Moscow or Peking, and guaranteed channels of prompt communications, the available intelligence may provide no signals, some signals, or ambiguous signals. Should the Kremlin decide on a pre-emptive attack on the US limited to missiles, the preparations would be minimal and indicators might be virtually non-existent. The other extreme would be a full-scale mobilization of the enemy's conventional forces to be utilized in conjunction with his missiles. In the latter case there may very well be sufficient indicators available to give warning that the enemy had developed his capabilities to the point where he could launch an attack at almost any time should he elect to do so.

In developing the tools of his trade, the warning analyst has sought to create yardsticks for measuring norms of behavior. Thus, when only a single gauge begins to register abnormally, there may be no particularly serious threat developing. As an increasing number of

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abnormalities begin to show up simultaneously, however, the warning analyst inches closer to the edge of his chair and seeks to determine the intent behind the enemy action.

The total picture presented by developing enemy action is rarely defined in sharp colors. It tends to be less than clear-cut, in part because of the constantly changing base lines which make last year's abnormalities this year's norms. By way of example, the Soviets' surface Mediterranean Squadron is now always present in the backyard of the 6th Fleet, and the Squadron's size has gradually expanded. There was no surface Mediterranean Squadron consistently on station the year-round prior to the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Soviet heavy bombers get "out-of-area" and touch off radar reactions in Iceland and the North American east coast periodically, both in numbers and at distances that would tend to be considered more or less normal, if not completely friendly at present.

There is a strong tendency in the ranks of professional bureaucrats to safeguard one's nether parts. For the warning analyst, however, continually to utter only shrill cries of "Wolf!" would obviously be no service to the policy-maker. For this reason the warning analyst, keeping in mind the possibility of the worst possible situation, must make a strenuous effort to give a realistic judgment on the significance of any collection of abnormalities. And since the enemy's activity may have been initiated for any one of a variety of reasons, he obviously must try to come up with the best possible assessment of enemy motivation. The enemy may be creating abnormalities as he prepares for a pre-emptive attack on the US or one of its allies; or he may be staging a magnificent bluff in support of a major political move; or as in the recent past he may be planning--right next door to NATO--to force one of his satellites back on to the straight and narrow path that leads to Socialist perfection, Moscow style.

It can be hazardous to measure present and future situations against past lessons. Nevertheless, past experience does suggest a number of observations that should help shape the warning analyst's general background and judgment.

#### Two Major Don'ts

Don't expect the enemy to apply the same logic to his estimates of the situation in question as the US analyst would. To wit, in the summer of 1968, there was a strongly-argued line current around the intelligence community that the Soviets probably would not invade Czechoslovakia since they would surely be deterred by the opprobrium with which the world would judge such an action.

Don't be a victim of the Easy or Logical Explanation Syndrome. It is frequently tempting to accept such an explanation even if it may not be the correct one. Thus, during the Korean War there was considerable warning that the Chinese might intervene in the conflict, but there was also a tendency to downgrade the seriousness of the Chinese threat. Instead it was interpreted as a diplomatic ploy designed to restrain the US and its allies by means short of direct military involvement.

### Three Great "Remembers"

Remember that US intelligence has been trapped before by misjudging the intended target(s) which an enemy is preparing to attack. Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the warning signals received by US intelligence were analyzed, in part at least, as pointing to a Japanese campaign against Southeast Asia, which turned out to be only a part of the whole truth.

Remember that repeated warnings can dull the reactions and wariness of both the policy-maker and the intelligence analyst. Warnings on North Korean intentions and capabilities were given repeatedly during the year prior to June 1950. How was one to distinguish the North Korean Army activities north of the DMZ in June 1950 as preparation for a jump-off when similar past activities prior to that time had proven invariably to be preparations for maneuvers?

Remember that history does not necessarily repeat itself. An excellent example of this was the Dutch hope prior to World War II that they would again be allowed to remain neutral as they were in World War I. The hope apparently grew into expectation. Thus, repeated warnings from a German military source located in the horse's mouth, including notices of postponements and changes in schedule, served largely as an irritant and caused disbelief in The Hague. Following receipt of the final warning, the deputy chief of Dutch intelligence is reported to have sought reassurance about German intentions by phoning the German military attache. In the latter's absence, his "charming wife" is reported to have given the Dutch bureaucrat the assurance he craved. The Dutch official thereupon went home, only a few hours before German ground forces rumbled over the Dutch frontier.

### The Two Important Questions

Do the enemy's actions signify an effort at deception and is he deliberately, or perhaps unintentionally, creating a mix of signals that point in virtually opposite directions? The missile crisis in Cuba is a well-remembered example of deception. Another possible example is the Hungarian revolution in 1956 when, in the face of

the rapid and large build-up of Soviet troops, Soviet officials in Hungary appear to have carried out a charade by fulfilling an agreement to withdraw Soviet forces from Budapest and apparently indicating agreement to discuss withdrawal from Hungary.

Does everyone have the warning? History records that some nine hours after the opening of the attack on Pearl Harbor, US planes were caught wing-tip to wing-tip at Clark Field in the Philippines.

The points cited are not an all-inclusive presentation of essential background for a warning analyst, but they are typical of points he might ideally check off in reaching a judgment. The points admittedly also overlap to a degree and have been placed under arbitrary designators.

In conclusion, the warning analyst's analysis should tend to sound more ominous than that of the current intelligence analyst. By definition, as the advocate of the worst possible situation, the indications analyst is expected to espouse that attitude in considering each new set of circumstances.

Given the state of modern Soviet weaponry, it is theoretically possible for the USSR to launch a bolt-from-the-blue without a single indication warning that the appropriate Kremlin finger is poised over the ICBM button. If the Soviet preparation, however, called for considerably more activity and of longer duration involving such diverse fields as political warnings, extraordinary civil defense measures, unusual Long Range Air Force deployments and/or an unusually large number of submarines out-of-area, the chances of sounding a tocsin would be considerably improved.

Several weeks prior to the 20 August 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, the warning machinery expressed the belief that the Soviets were militarily prepared to intervene if the Kremlin considered it necessary. If the reader will accept this warning as a satisfactory example of what might be expected from strategic intelligence, then the number of hours devoted to the indications type of sentry duty represent a reasonably inexpensive US insurance policy--possibly straight life.

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POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE:

The Arab-Israeli War\*

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Among the developments leading up to the outbreak of war between Israel and its Arab neighbors in June 1967, there were some in Washington that provide one of those relatively rare instances in which the visible impact of intelligence on national policy is specific and clear cut.

A number of circumstances came together to make this possible. First, the basic question which the policy makers asked--who will win if the US stays out?--was sharply defined. Second, the duration of the "crisis," as far as the production of premonitory intelligence and short-term judgments were concerned, was only some three weeks, from mid-May to dawn of 5 June. The basic issues thus had no time to become fogged over. Third, the impact of the intelligence judgment was the more explosive in that this judgment ran nearly head-on into the initial impressions of some, at least, of the administration's top advisers.

This last point, which lends drama to the role of intelligence in this episode, is not easy to document. At the time, however, it was nonetheless reasonably clear that in fairly high quarters in Washington the first reaction to Nasir's opening moves in mid-May--the mobilization of Egyptian forces and their deployment into Sinai, followed by the withdrawal of the UN screening forces there--was to assume that we were witnessing the unfolding of a calculated Soviet-Arab plan to eliminate Israel (and ultimately the US) from the area. Given this assumption, and the strength--at least on paper--of the Soviet-backed Arab forces, it seemed likely that "little Israel" would lose the war being prepared against it. Furthermore, given the extent of the emotional attachment to Israel in this country developed over twenty years in the form of moral if not political

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\* Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter 1969), pp. 1-8.

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\*\* [ ] is an officer in CIA's current intelligence organization.

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commitments, it appeared to follow that the US ought to move tangibly and quickly to Israel's support. Indeed, a number of US actions early in the crisis appear to have sprung from these assumptions and this logic. Thus, the way was cleared for an emergency airlift to Israel of spare parts, ammunition, and, because of the Egyptians' known use of chemical agents in Yemen, chemical defense equipment.

### The Intelligence View

The US intelligence community was virtually unanimous in rejecting these assumptions and judgments. Soviet and Arab-Israeli experts were agreed that Nasir's initial moves must have been conceived out of misinformation about immediate Israeli intentions, and that this misinformation had reached Nasir because of miscalculation somewhere in the Soviet apparatus. On the most critical point, it was nearly unanimously agreed that if the war came the Israelis would be able to defeat Nasir and the other Arabs combined, and that the Soviet military would not physically intervene. In short, the intelligence community saw no carefully calculated Arab-Soviet plan. It saw instead a Soviet blunder being compounded, to Moscow's embarrassment, by the responses of Arab leaders ridden with the compulsion to react against what they read as Israeli threats.

These contrasting views of the origin of the crisis and of the likely outcome of hostilities first collided at the top policy level on Tuesday, 23 May, the day after the Egyptians announced that the Gulf of Aqaba was henceforth closed to Israeli shipping. On the morning of that date, the President called the Director of Central Intelligence out of a briefing session with the House Armed Services Subcommittee to tell him that Ambassador Goldberg had telephoned from New York, complaining that there had been no warning of a Middle East crisis, and worrying over the possibility of a war which Israel, in Goldberg's opinion, could not win. The President asked the Director for papers on these subjects.

The Director in turn levied these requirements on his deputy for intelligence, asking that the responses be delivered to him before the White House regular Tuesday lunch.\* The papers--"US Knowledge of Egyptian Alert," and "Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capa-

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\* There were at the moment less than four hours remaining in which these papers had to be finished, prayed over, and delivered.

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bilities"--were drafted by a task force\* which had been brought into being earlier the same morning. (The Egyptian announcement had also triggered the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board, which had been called into special session at 0300.)

The two memoranda, plus a general situation briefing for the Director's own use, were delivered to him in the ground floor lobby outside Walt Rostow's White House office. At the lunch, in addition to the President and the DCI, were Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Wheeler (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), George Christian (the White House press officer), and Walt Rostow.

The "who will win" memorandum was clearly crucial. It delivered "the judgment of the intelligence community" that, on the ground, Israel could "hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully a major offensive on the fourth."\*\* In the air, the Israelis "probably could defeat the Egyptian air force if Israel's air facilities were not damaged beyond repair." This memorandum concluded that, although the Egyptian forces had "improved substantially" since 1956, nevertheless "we consider that the Israeli forces have retained an over-all superiority." On the spot, the President asked Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler whether they concurred in this judgment. After they did so, he ordered both papers delivered to Ambassador Goldberg in New York.

#### Second Round

Wednesday, 24 May, was devoted by the intelligence community and the policy people to digesting developments and refining their appreciations. A regularly scheduled National Security Council meeting took up problems of South Arabia, while on the intelligence level the USIB Watch Committee met once again to sift the evidence bearing on possible Soviet intervention in the crisis. The Watch Committee concluded that "direct Soviet military involvement" was highly unlikely."

Next day (25 May), however, activity stepped up. The [redacted] weighed in [redacted] with a written estimate of the situation which described Arab

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\* A task force in current intelligence parlance is a peculiar invention, not entirely dissimilar in conception from the Manhattan Project, the object of which is to bring into organized relations all who can help the intelligence effort during a crisis.

\*\* The fronts envisioned were the Sinai, Syrian, Jordanian, and Lebanese.

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The Agency's paper judged that the Egyptian positions in Sinai were essentially defensive, that the other Arabs' troop movements were gestures for political effect, and that the possibility of the Egyptians using chemical warfare could be discounted since the local conditions were most unfavorable. The paper took the position that "the Soviet aim is still to avoid military involvement and to give the US a black eye among the Arabs by identifying it with Israel." The paper concluded that the Soviets "probably could not openly help the Arabs because of lack of capability, and probably would not for fear of confrontation with the US."

Early on the evening of the 25th, a high-level group\* assembled in Walt Rostow's office at the White House. Secretary Rusk, having seen Eban, asked if the Director agreed with ONE's comments. [redacted] Told that the Director did indeed agree, the Secretary commented: "Dick, there is only one thing I want to say--as LaGuardia once remarked, if this is a mistake, it's a beaut." The group then moved to the President's office.

The President had read the two papers, and again quizzed the Director and General Wheeler--was the US assessment solid? The President evidently had in mind both the question of Egyptian and Soviet intentions and the "who will win" issue, which Goldberg was still

\* Rusk, Cyrus Vance (vice McNamara who was out of town), General Wheeler, Eugene Rostow, and the Director.

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picking at. The Director replied, "we'll scrub it down again," and following the meeting threw the CIA machinery once again into gear, to produce the next day what has a good claim to have been the classic paper of the crisis, "Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States."

#### Reassessment and Reassertion

This paper, product of a coordinated effort by ONE, elements of CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and the Defense Intelligence Agency, considerably sharpened but did not in essence alter the assessment given the President by the Director two days earlier. It estimated that the Israelis could attain air superiority over Sinai in 24 hours after taking the initiative or in two or three days if the Egyptians struck first, and that Israeli armed forces could breach Egypt's forward lines in Sinai within "several" days, although the paper foresaw a need for the Israeli ground forces to regroup and resupply before they could move to the Suez Canal.\*

As for Syria and Jordan, this paper was even more prescient. It judged that the Syrians had no capability for a successful attack and said the Israelis could break the Syrian line, though with relatively heavy casualties because of the terrain and the Syrians' fortifications. Regarding Jordan, the paper estimated that if Jordan undertook more than very limited operations, Israel could occupy most of the West Bank in a few days once major fighting with Egypt had subsided.

This paper was disseminated about mid-afternoon on 26 May. Policy makers therefore had not yet read it when they again convened in the White House Cabinet room that day. They did have, however, an ONE memorandum, "The Middle Eastern Crisis," which spelled out at some length the view of the intelligence community in general and of CIA in particular on how the crisis had come about and how it might develop. The President asked the group, which on this occasion included advisers Clark Clifford and Abe Fortas as well as the officials responsible for national security affairs, to read the paper. Its theses also contradicted the "little Israel under Red attack" view.

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\* Original drafts had said "two to three" days would be needed by the Israelis to break the Sinai defenses, and "seven to nine" days to reach the Canal, but this precision was sacrificed in the debate of coordination.

While ONE conceded that Moscow might have encouraged Nasir to believe that his forces could stand off an Israeli offensive once they were deployed in Sinai, the estimators did not believe that "the whole operation is a Soviet plan, or that the Soviets urged him to his present course of action." Indeed, ONE said it believed that the Soviets would almost certainly advise Nasir against a military show-down with Israel. Noting that Nasir had won the "first round" and appeared to be standing pat, this paper clearly implied that Israel, facing "dismaying choices," might well react dangerously. The Israelis had the choice of risking a military strike, or of acquiescing in the "permanent closing" of the Strait of Tiran. Specifying Israel's dilemma, ONE was "inclined to believe that unless the US and other major powers take whatever steps are necessary to reopen the Strait, the Israelis will feel compelled to go to war." In discussing the Soviet role and probable actions, ONE repeated its earlier judgment that the Soviets would not intervene with their own combat forces, even though Nasir's defeat by Israel would, by extension, be a "grave setback" for the USSR itself.

Although it is nowhere spelled out in the intelligence record, the cumulative impact of these judgments over three successive days evidently led to policy decisions limiting the US material commitment in support of Israel to a fairly narrow range of "defensive" military items. Perhaps more important, it was made clear to the Israelis that, if they chose to take the military initiative, they would have to go it alone. Rarely has the intelligence community spoken so clearly, as rapidly, and with such unanimity. The result was early adoption of a policy posture in consonance with the intelligence judgment.

#### Denouement

This was of course not the end, nor by any means the whole, of the story of the intelligence contribution to policy planning up to the

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
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Directorate of Intelligence elements at CIA, configured in the so-called Arab-Israel task force, had meanwhile come essentially to the same conclusion. On 3 June the task force issued to the community a self-initiated memorandum entitled "The Current Focus of the Near East Crisis," which warned that "all reporting from Israel shows mounting pressure for a 'decision'," while the Arabs, on their side were "sniffing blood." In this situation, the task force emphasized the dangers, physical as well as psychological, to US material and strategic interests in the area, and observed that "the damage to the US position in the area already appears serious." With these documents in hand, the whistle of Israeli jets--and the crash of breaking embassy windows--surely came as no surprise to those who were awakened early on 5 June.


As indicated earlier, however, the story would be incomplete without some reference to the flood of requests for memoranda which, in addition to the requirements of the regular intelligence and estimative media, inundated intelligence components during this period. The records of the Arab-Israel task force give some of the flavor of those days--and nights:



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The story told here is obviously one of a "success." The intelligence community was "right," and the "right" answers reached the very top quickly and in immediately usable form. Were we lucky? Did we merely have on tap, for this occasion, a group of unusually perceptive analysts and capable drafters? In part, the answers are perhaps yes. The present writer, having been one of them, is not inclined to dismiss the idea that talented people were in fact



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involved. But he is inclined to point out that the judgments were not concocted for the occasion. On the contrary, the community had repeatedly addressed itself to most of these very questions for a dozen years, through formal estimates and--at least as, if not more important in bringing a body of experts to rub minds together--through the Arab-Israeli Ad Hoc Working Group.

This group, which produced--and still produces--the "Arab-Israeli Handbook," had been meeting periodically under the aegis of CIA's Office of Current Intelligence since before the 1956 Suez war. Originally focusing on deliveries of Soviet equipment to the Arab states, the handbook had gradually expanded into a compendium of political and military facts and current military judgments. Moreover, over the years, experts from CIA, State, DIA, and NSA had learned to know each other, to work together, and to debate on the basis of a commonly-shared corpus of information. Thus, when Nasir made his move and the Israelis reacted, the spadework on the central problems had long since been done, and the policy makers could be presented with informed judgments confidently arrived at.

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VIEW FROM THE HOT SHOP\*

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Shortly after 0600 on the morning of 12 December 1967, a high-

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Its subject was an impending attempt at a counter-coup against the Greek junta by King Constantine and several army officers. Here is what ensued during the next hour and forty-eight minutes:

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0607--Senior Duty Officer briefs the CIA current intelligence chief and the DCI's Deputy for Intelligence by telephone. They order that appropriate intelligence analysts be called in at once and that the DCI be alerted.

0612--Watch officers phone analysts as ordered.

0615--SDO canvasses intelligence community seeking additional information. State has received a high-precedence cable from the Athens embassy and is phoning Assistant Secretary Battle.

0620--SDO briefs DCI. DCI instructs SDO to brief Walt Rostow by telephone at his home.

0625--SDO briefs Rostow. Rostow instructs SDO to inform White House situation room\*\*\* that he will be coming to his office immediately, but that the President should not be awakened.

0630--Rostow's instructions passed to White House situation room.

\* Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1968), pp. 39-45.

\*\* [redacted] are officers of the CIA current intelligence organization.

\*\*\* Staffed by officers seconded from the CIA Operations Center, the Situation Room performs a parallel function for the President and his national security assistants.

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0636--Rostow phones to make sure that Secretary of State Rusk (in Brussels) is being informed. SDO confirms that State's Greek desk is sending a cable to Rusk.

0637--DCI phones and is brought up to date.

0642--State sends copy of the cable from Athens embassy by LDX.\* Reuters is now reporting that tanks have surrounded Prime Minister's residence in Athens.

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0657--

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0719--Rostow instructs SDO to set up a teleconference [redacted]  
25X1A [redacted] to procure certain information [redacted] had  
been unable to obtain.

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0723--SDO proceeds to Signal Center to arrange the direct teleprinter connection.

0755--SDO briefs Rostow to the effect that Constantine had left Athens, arrived safely in Larissa in northern Greece, and broadcast a message to the nation. State operations center and NMCC also briefed.

The record of this activity in the Operations Center at the dawn of 12 December, when a potentially serious crisis appeared about to engulf an ally of the United States, is significant because it shows that the standard intelligence processes, from collection and communication to evaluation and dissemination, were successfully accomplished--out of normal business hours--despite the speed with which the crisis developed. Senior policy officials of the government were thus placed in possession not merely of information but of finished intelligence in which they could repose confidence.

\* Long-distance xerography. This is a system for secure and virtually instantaneous facsimile transmission. Terminals are at the White House, the Department of State, the Pentagon, NSA, and the CIA Operations Center. A manuscript the size of the Encyclopedia Britannica could be transmitted in two and a half days by this process.

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The Operations Center is an instrument by which the DCI can provide intelligence to the right quarters at the propitious time, i.e., when decisions about action have to be made. The Greek example is but one of many that might be cited to illustrate the manner in which the Center, in business around the clock, performs an alerting function and facilitates rapid transmission of intelligence throughout the intelligence community and to the White House. This instance illustrates also the vital relation between the Operations Center and the substantive resources of the Agency, whose analytic and current intelligence reporting responsibilities it supports.

Finally, the Greek episode exemplifies the extreme pressure for detailed and timely intelligence support that builds up at the nexus of the policy-making and intelligence communities in periods of crisis. The growth of this avidity for the product of intelligence is surely one of the significant developments in the American governmental system during the past decade or so. The Operations Center is a systematic attempt to help satisfy this appetite, which almost certainly will not diminish.

#### The Mechanics

Regardless of the method chosen, an attempt to provide round-the-clock continuity in current intelligence support is bound to be an intricate undertaking. The general problem is the troublesome one common to all intelligence, that of converting an input categorized by source into an output separated out by subject and significance. During the normal working day, principles of division of labor and quite detailed specialization can be applied in organizing the institutional solution. As for the rest of the time, it was long debated whether it would in peacetime be possible to fund and staff a reduced but similar operation for around-the-clock alerting. The alternative approach, that of the Operations Center, is to concentrate attention on the inputs most likely to be productive in a still more skeletonized and specialized operation, mechanically equipped to the fullest degree feasible. From the substantive point of view, this kind of operation will be successful to the extent that it can call upon the effective backing of major research and analytical resources.

Very roughly speaking, the inputs to the Operations Center are selected according to the way in which they have been communicated. The general category with which the Center mainly deals is information electrically communicated through official channels. As will be seen, however, there are many exceptions even to this.

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The channels into the Center are complex. An adjacent signal facility receives special intelligence from NSA and advance cable traffic from the State Department. The Cable Secretariat, which disseminates within CIA most message traffic, provides State and Defense Department cables and intelligence information reports cabled from CIA field stations. The clandestine services duty officer makes available intelligence from operational cable traffic which otherwise might not be disseminated for some hours.

The Operations Center also maintains constant contact by secure means with other intelligence centers in the Washington area. The NSA Command Center answers questions concerning special intelligence. The State Department Operation Center makes immediately available via LDX any particularly sensitive traffic. The National Military Command Center of the JCS puts on the LDX military operations cables which might otherwise be delayed for several hours or not be sent to CIA at all. The DIA Intelligence Support and Indications Center, the National Indications Center, and other duty offices throughout the government also provide the Operations Center with information or evaluations in areas in which they possess special competence.

In addition, the Center subscribes to the full wire services of the Associated Press, United Press International, and Reuters and receives the teletyped output of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

From the stream of information flowing in through these channels--and it averages 135 separate reports every hour around the clock--the Center seeks to filter out first that which is of critical significance, and secondly that which may be less critical but is nevertheless of capital importance. The second of these categories is in practice considerably larger than the first.

#### Some Critical Cases

In the category of critical intelligence, a degree of automatic selection has been built into the process in the form of the Criti(cal)-com(munications) System, under which messages designated CRITIC by the field in accordance with a criterion that they "may require the immediate attention of the President,"\* are expedited by NSA to the intelligence community and the White House. The first report on 22 January 1968 of what quickly developed into the "Pueblo"

\* See [redacted] in Studies IV 2, p. 19 ff.


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incident was an example of a CRITIC. So was the CIA cable of 30 January reporting the Viet Cong attack on the U.S. Embassy compound in Saigon.

Critical intelligence, however, does not invariably get put into the Criticom System. On 20 April 1967 at 2058 hours the U.S. Embassy in Athens reported by a merely FLASH cable that the Prime Minister of Greece had been seized in a military coup. On 15 November 1967 at 0950 the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia reported under FLASH precedence that fighting had broken out between the Greeks and Turks at Kophinori, beginning the Cyprus crisis. On 5 June 1967 at 0300 the U.S. Embassy at Tel Aviv confirmed by FLASH precedence that fighting between the Arabs and the Israelis had begun. In all these cases it was up to the Operations Center to recognize that the reports fell well within the definition of critical intelligence and take action accordingly.

To complicate matters further, critical intelligence may come from many sources other than high-precedence cables. For instance, the earliest intimation of the freshened tension that led to the Six Day War was supplied by Reuters on 17 May 1967 when Egyptian forces replaced those of the U.N. on the Israeli border. FBIS was the first to report the outbreak of fighting between the antagonists at 0240 on 5 June. UPI was the first press agency to report that the Egyptians had broken the cease fire on 9 June.

On 24 June 1967, the CIA  provided the first information that Premier Kosygin was leaving New York to go to Cuba; it was the sole source of this information for the Washington intelligence community. The CIA action officer at the NMCC relayed word from Eglin Air Force Base on 4 January 1967 that a Mace missile had escaped control and was on its way over Cuba despite attempts at automatic self-destruction and an unsuccessful pursuit by F-104s. On 27 July 1967, the D.C. Civil Defense Emergency Operations Center at Lorton, Virginia, reported disturbances close to CIA facilities in Alexandria, Virginia, as the result of the arrest of H. Rap Brown. In all these instances, the role of the Operations Center was to recognize the potentially critical significance of the information and to initiate the appropriate alert and action procedures.

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#### The Less Than Critical

In a sense, coping with the second category of information, that which is less than critical but nevertheless important, presents the more difficulties. This is only partly because there is substantially more of it. Lacking the formal or mechanical aids which



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often identify critical traffic and its almost invariably self-evident importance, the lower category requires resort to judgment, general knowledge, imagination, and all-around lore in the techniques of intelligence. Here it is not enough to be knowledgeable about the principal situations and intelligence questions of primary current interest. The ideal is to be able not only to detect evidence of significant movement in matters known to be of concern but also to recognize the advent of new problems that may well become of concern. Successful anticipation is of course one of the objects of intelligence. The analytical attack upon the evidence of such emergent problems begins in the Operations Center and the headquarters components with which it is so closely linked.

Both the Cable Secretariat and the Operations Center are involved in the mechanical process. The Secretariat, as the primary reception and dissemination point within CIA for State, Defense, and CIA information cables, selects the most significant and perishable traffic for rapid distribution to Agency officials and, in the case of CIA cables, to the White House. It sends material selected for current intelligence components in the CIA Directorate of Intelligence directly to the Operations Center in enough copies for fast distribution. There the SDO reviews it substantively and may alert senior officials in the Directorate immediately if he thinks this warranted.

As a precaution, the Cable Secretariat also sends to the Operations Center copies of the remaining traffic received but not selected for rapid distribution. All this material is reviewed in the Center, which may then request the distribution of any items that have eluded the Secretariat and at the same time alert or consult with the appropriate area specialists about them. The Operations Center thus is in a position to insure that all available significant intelligence information, regardless of source, is quickly reviewed, checked with other operation centers, evaluated by specialists, and distributed to senior officials.

#### Trends and Principles

It is perhaps obvious from the foregoing that considerable technical and bureaucratic ingenuity--not to speak of money--has been lavished on the effort to buy time for the making of informed judgments. This effort has so far evidently been on the whole successful. There is, moreover, reason to believe that communications and other technical improvements now in the development stage will in time both enlarge the volume of information available to the Center and facilitate its handling. Some categories of potentially valuable reporting which for a variety of reasons are not now readily accessible to the Center may in time become so. Other improvements in the system

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that cannot presently be foreseen may be forthcoming in due course to increase efficiency and perhaps the quality of the product. Certainly, in the era of the computer it would be rash to predict that the task of the Operations Center will remain unchanged.

Other trends that are also now visible, however, raise some serious questions, not only for the Operations Center but for the business of current intelligence in general. We have seen how there is increasing demand for greater volumes of detailed intelligence at times of crisis. At such times the classic responsibility of intelligence for evaluation of raw information tends to become absorbed in policy-making. The question being put to intelligence more and more often nowadays--and not necessarily only at times of crisis--is, "What is happening in country X at this moment?" This bespeaks the impulse of the policy-maker, himself subject to relentless pressures, to get at his problem as directly as possible, the better to grapple with it. His real desire, in a word, is to experience personally the events that concern him as they are occurring. One effect of this tendency, as we have seen, is greatly to constrict the time available to intelligence to practice its arcane arts. But the effect is compounded because the demand is not only for speed but for the greatest possible precision, which necessarily implies detail.

It is indeed up to intelligence to answer speedily the question, "What is happening in country X at this moment?" but this is not the most important question it is responsible for answering, and the intelligence community ought not to encourage the assumption that it is. Rather, intelligence renders its highest service in answering the question, "What do you make of what is happening in country X?" Answering this requires the application of analytical judgment.

A kind of Gresham's Law that operates in the market place for intelligence could favor a trend to the first question: mistaken intelligence tends to erode confidence in the commodity in general and in the institution that produces it. The existence of a certain field of confidence is thus essential if intelligence is to perform its useful service. It is therefore to be hoped that future technical innovations to speed the acquisition of information in intelligence work in general, as well as in the Operations Center, will have as their ultimate purpose the improvement of intelligence judgments. It should not be a system for rapid communication of raw material that rouses mighty chiefs from their couches in the murk of early dawn, but confidence in our selection and evaluation and in the finished intelligence we produce.

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CLOUD 9: A PROBLEM IN INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION\*

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On the 24th of January this year there descended upon the Directorate for Intelligence a document that for a brief but frantic period was to try the resources of the Directorate in some ways more severely than they had ever before been tested. This document was a National Security Council directive, later dubbed by those who became involved in it, with appropriate irony, "Cloud Nine." This directive called for an inventory of the international situation as of January 20, 1969, in the form of a "current assessment of the political, economic, and security situation and of the major problems relevant to US security interests and US bilateral and multilateral relations" worldwide. It demanded, in addition, "a discussion, where appropriate, of the data upon which judgments are based, uncertainties regarding the data, and alternative possible interpretations of the data." To make certain that the response was properly pointed, the directive posed, in 52 pages, a total of 893 probing questions touching almost every country on the globe. The answers were to be in the President's hands by the 20th of February, a matter of 26 days, including weekends.

Obviously this was a task of formidable magnitude, one that at first glance appeared almost impossible of fulfillment in the time span allotted. Of course, certain short cuts could be taken. It is always tempting, for example, when confronted with a requirement of these dimensions, to look on the shelf for already canned material that could be dusted off, updated if necessary, and ladled out lukewarm to the consumer. Another time saving device is to by-pass the usual processes of editing and review, sending forward immediately from the typewriter the analyst's sweaty draft. Unfortunately, although in many instances, at least, the analyst views the draft as perfect, the editor thinks it is merely perfectible, and his ministrations toward that laudable end take time.

In this case, it was decided that there would be no short cuts. A really fresh look at the situation would be taken, candid judgments would be rendered, and the answers would be made as incisive and unequivocal as it lay in our power to make them. Each answer would be

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\*Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Fall 1969).

25X1A \* [ ] is a senior CIA current intelligence officer.



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responsibly edited, and the entire lot would be reviewed by two senior officers -- one of them the chairman of the task force established to complete the project -- who would ensure that, stylistically and substantively, the whole massive response met the high standards set by the DDI. In appearance the response was to be neat and attractive, if not as psychedelically colorful as a Madison Avenue product, and it was to be carefully packaged. And finally, in the words of the Director, as far as CIA was concerned, at least, the deadline would be met. His determination in this respect may have been influenced somewhat by knowledge that the directive had been levied also on the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, putting the Agency, in a sense, in competition with them for timely production of a quality product.

The manner in which inter-Office and inter-Directorate teams were manned and organized to prepare the answers and get them edited and coordinated is a complex story in itself. Here, however, we propose to deal with a different aspect of the Cloud 9 problem, one with which we are well acquainted, especially in current intelligence production, but which is not generally thought of until it becomes potentially a major obstacle, as it did in the case of Cloud 9. This aspect embraces the mechanics of reproduction, the process of getting a clean draft typed, a final draft printed, and a finished product ready for distribution to meet a deadline.

Anyone with any experience in the management of current intelligence is likely to be more familiar than he likes with the sentence, "It's in the typewriter." This sentence, usually uttered in a tone of bored indifference by a writer who has been asked what has happened to an item that has a rapidly approaching deadline, typifies an all too common feeling among professionals that once the draft is written, the work is done and the project completed. Would that it were so; our task would be much easier. Few, of course, would buy the proposition that the clerical process is as difficult or complex or even as valuable as the analytical/writing process. But the fact remains that in many instances, unless the analyst's work is typed and reproduced and distributed at the right time, the analyst might just as well not have done it at all, for all the effect it will have. So from this point of view, the clerical process, whatever else its level in the scale of values in the profession of intelligence, is just as essential as the analytical one. And it is played down or disregarded only at the peril of derailing the entire train of intelligence production.

In the case of Cloud 9, it was clear from the outset that the production process, unless carefully managed, would unquestionably defeat us. This was partly the result of the sheer bulk of the project. It stemmed also from the decision to start from scratch and to apply the full editorial review machinery to the final product. It was closely related, obviously,

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to the shortness of the deadline: there were less than three weeks left after the writing teams had been organized in which to finish and deliver the product. And, of course, the fact that all of the production personnel involved in Cloud 9 had other duties that normally occupied them full time, duties that still had to be carried on simultaneously, compounded an already difficult situation. Given all of these factors, it was legitimate to question whether the deadline would, in fact, be met as we plunged into work.

It was estimated originally that CIA's response to the NSC directive would require about 1000 pages, and in actuality this was only slightly below the mark. Each original contribution would be subjected to at least two levels of editing. No one, least of all the analyst, was hopeful that minimum alterations in the first or any subsequent draft would suffice. The average editor is said to live by the principle that the pen is mightier than the sword, and it is commonly held that he forgets that both can be equally lethal against their natural targets. So it was conceivable that every contribution to the aggregate response would have to be typed a minimum of three times and quite possibly, when finally reviewed, for a fourth. The massive size of this typing load made potentially a serious obstacle to our meeting the deadline, a built-in impediment at every stage of production between the writer, the reviewer, and finally the print shop. A back log of any consequence at any stage of the process could cause us to miss the target date by a wide margin.

In fact, the key to the success of any large operation of this sort is to establish and adhere to a realistically shared writing - typing - correction schedule that will ensure a smooth, steady, and controlled flow of material from the writers through the editors to the printers. This began, in the case of Cloud 9, with scheduling the actual writing so that the answers to the easier questions would be prepared and edited first and the more difficult ones deferred until close to the deadline. It was hoped, and indeed it turned out to be the case, that the senior reviewers would be confronted on any given day with no less and if possible very little more than they could plow through in around ten hours. Since these two gentlemen constituted a marked constriction in the pipeline, having to read everything, it was mandatory that their part of the operation proceed smoothly.

To ensure the essential control of the flow of material, a control center was established in OCI's Publications Support group. Here a number was assigned to each question in the NSC directive (they were unnumbered in the document itself) and notation made of the team and office responsible for producing the answer and of the scheduled date of delivery to the senior reviewers. As the various answers were written, edited, and typed in second draft, they were sent to the control center. The center, in turn, passed them to the senior reviewers. When the latter had finished

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massaging them, they were returned to the control center, which then had them put on mats in final form and sent them to the print shop for reproduction. The control center could tell at any time, and kept the Task Force Chief informed, whether the production schedule was being maintained, where any particular answer was at any time, etc. The system made it possible also to have the individual answers printed as they were completed, regardless of sequence, and to ensure that assembly and pagination of the entire response could be done in orderly fashion at the very end of the process. Obviously it would have been fatal to hold the drafts until all parts of the response were in and had been put in the sequence required by the NSC directive before beginning to print them.

The production schedule was extremely tight, and there was little latitude for slippage. We were fighting the clock to such an extent that rather than hand carry, we used the pneumatic tube system to get papers from one part of the building to another without delay, and to keep everyone busy. At one point, the tube system broke down, causing a certain amount of panic until the missing papers were located and extracted, and business could go ahead again.

Despite this and a few other lapses, our attack on the Cloud 9 problem was well organized, and it proved to be effective. The flow of manuscripts actually began earlier than expected, and no large backlog developed at any time. But even with the best organized and most rational schedule, we would still have failed to deliver on time if we had not had the MIST -- Magnetic Tape Selectric Typewriter. We had eleven, and sometimes twelve, of these machines at our disposal, five of them in OCI's Publication Support group and the remainder elsewhere in the Intelligence Directorate. We could have used more, since not all of the substantive teams had one available to them. The answers to the vast majority of the questions, however, were put on magnetic tape after initial editing and review had been completed by the substantive teams. The tapes and the corresponding typed drafts were then delivered to the Control Center in OCI, where the tapes were retained while the senior reviewers were working independently on their copies of the drafts. The revisions made at this level were then, with the aid of the MIST, incorporated in a finished, corrected tape and a final draft typed simultaneously.

The advantage that the MIST has over the ordinary manual or electric typewriter, and its unique contribution to Cloud 9, may not be apparent from this generalized description of procedures. So to be a little more specific: At a reasonable estimate, probably less than five percent of all the pages in the analysts' original typescripts were completely untouched in both levels of review. Fetying all of these pages by hand would have been enormously time-consuming, not to mention the strain it would have imposed on the typists themselves. But when a draft on tape is run

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through the machine, the MTST retypes automatically at a very high rate of speed. The trained operator stops the machine wherever a correction is necessary, enters the change on the corrected tape, simultaneously, and directs the machine to proceed until the next change is encountered. By this means a clean, corrected draft, together with a new tape, is rapidly produced with a minimum of effort compared with what would be required without the MTST. Depending upon which stage of production we are talking about, this new draft is either a typescript designed for further review or a mat for printing, if final review has been completed. We believe that without the MTST, it would have taken about twice the number of typists twice the time to do the same job.

A final factor bearing on our success with Cloud 9 -- intangible but nonetheless critical -- was the morale of the machine operators. Theirs was an exacting task, and, despite the magic of the MTST, a nerve-racking one because of the constant pressure on them to get the thing done, and done accurately. Their performance was splendid, their pride in their work obvious and justified. At one point when the Task Force Chief inadvertently referred to them as typists, he was politely but firmly told that they were machine operators. The distinction is a valid one. The girls do have to be trained to operate the MTST, and certain stages of their work are somewhat akin to computer programming.

Between February 3, when Cloud 9 drafts began to pile into Publication Support's office, and February 16, when the mats were finished, the machine operators worked every day. The five in the Publication Support group, alone, together with three proofreaders, racked up a total of 378 hours of overtime. Their supervisor had to watch them closely -- a pleasurable occupation in any event -- for signs of exhaustion and falling efficiency. Occasionally he had to tell one to pack up and go home. But he was most impressed by their energy and drive and their devotion to duty, which clearly went beyond any desire for overtime compensation.

Once the mats were done, the only remaining hurdles to be surmounted were printing and assembling the answers. These tasks were performed in Printing and Services Division's plant on the seventh floor of Headquarters Building, operating around the clock. Considering that the various parts of the project were delivered to the plant piece-meal and were printed on arrival, without regard for the final order of the answers, the job of collation alone was staggering. Small changes in the texts, moreover, were being introduced up to the very last moment. Printing and Services Division designated a Control Officer for Cloud 9 who, in close coordination with the Control Center in OCI, maintained the flow of mats into the seventh floor plant and ensured that the printing schedule was maintained. High standards of appearance were demanded and met. And, of course, in this as in other Agency components engaged in Cloud 9, regular routine work requirements had to be carried on at the same time.

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When Cloud 9 was finished and put together, it filled 7 volumes and 1030 pages, counting inserts. The product was the result of a team effort probably unparalleled in the Agency's history, involving co-operation - smooth at all times - between elements of the DDP, ONE, DDI, DDS & T, and DCS.

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
APPENDIX A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

30 July 1969

1. Brief -- Communist China
2. Notes

S E C R E T



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Communist China: The appointment of a new provincial revolutionary committee chairman in Kwangtung may attest to the growing influence in Peking of chief of the general staff Huang Yung-sheng.

The important post was previously held by Huang, the longtime Canton Military Region commander, but had been vacant since March 1968 when Huang became chief of staff. The long delay in replacing Huang suggests that the choice of a successor may have generated considerable debate among competing interest groups in Peking.

The new chairman, Liu Hsing-yuan, has served as a political commissar in the Canton Military Region since at least 1955 and is among Huang's close associates in Kwangtung. Liu was promoted over the head of K'ung Shih-ch'uan, who has been "first vice chairman" of the revolutionary committee since it was established in February 1968 and had been acting chairman since Huang's departure the following month. K'ung was sent to Kwangtung from Peking during a period of radical resurgence in May 1967 to serve as a high-ranking political officer in the Canton Military Region.

Huang is clearly on the rise. His counsel and approval no doubt were instrumental in confirming the Kwangtung appointment. Moreover, the recent upgrading of the office of the chief of general staff reflects his enhanced personal stature. Huang's ascent is further evidence that some regional military leaders have been acquiring a significant share of political influence in Peking. [ ]

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UN - Middle East: [ ] reports that General Odd Bull, chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization, has decided to close temporarily two observer posts, one on each side of the Suez Canal. If conditions do not improve, Bull plans to close four more of the 18 posts shortly. The UN political adviser on the scene reportedly is urging that all observers be withdrawn on humanitarian grounds. According to press reports, UN officials met yesterday in New York with representatives of the seven nations contributing observers to consider the situation. [ ]

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Nigeria: Pope Paul's efforts to bring about peace negotiations between the Nigerians and Biafrans during his visit to Uganda on 31 July - 2 August are not likely to be productive. The federal government and the Biafrans, however, are sending delegations to meet with the Pope. Nigerian and Biafran delegations are now in Geneva to discuss relief operations, but this also seems unlikely to lead to serious peace negotiations. [ ]

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East Germany - Guinea: A high-level East German delegation which arrived in Conakry on 26 July presumably is attempting to persuade the Guineans to establish diplomatic relations with Pankow. The delegation, led by politburo member Albert Norden, probably will attempt to convince the Guineans that now is the time to recognize Pankow, and that such a move would not offend Bonn. As in the case of the six other countries which previously extended recognition, the East Germans may also offer to grant further economic assistance to Guinea. [ ]

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(continued)

30 Jul 69

Central Intelligence Bulletin

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APPENDIX B

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY #35

November 1967

INDIA

S E C R E T

## 1. Introduction

India,\* the most populous country of the free world, is rich in natural resources, militarily the strongest non-Communist nation in Asia, and geographically situated to command the Indian Ocean and the strategic Suez-Singapore sea lanes. It is a culturally complex country whose leaders are striving to maintain national political unity and to keep population growth from outstripping food production and economic growth. Though increasing in both economic strength and military power, India faces internal problems that could lead to prolonged economic stagnation, domestic political instability, and further deterioration of international influence.

The leading political force is the Congress Party, spearhead in the fight for independence from the United Kingdom that culminated successfully in 1947. The party achieved major successes in unifying the country and providing some degree of stability to the national economy. It made the general principles of state socialism, secularism, and nonalignment in international affairs Indian national policy. However, its control of the national government was seriously weakened in the 1967 elections. Its majority in the national Parliament was substantially reduced and it has lost control of 9 of the 17 states.

The death in 1964 of Jawaharlal Nehru, India's charismatic Prime Minister, posed the Congress Party with a leadership crisis. Neither the brief incumbency of Lal Behادر Shastri, who died in January 1966, nor that of Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter who succeeded Shastri, has filled the leadership void left by Nehru. Disunity within the ranks continues to weaken the Congress Party organization.

The Indian Communist movement, around which opposition to the Congress Party at one time seemed to be polarizing, has attracted little further support since the mid-1950's, although the Communists managed to capture control of one state government—that of Kerala—in the elections of 1957 and again in 1967. Factionalism within the movement has intensified as a result of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute and other contentious issues. In 1964 the party split, with one of the successor parties remaining loyal to Moscow and the other espousing many of the Chinese

party's militant tactics but stopping considerably short of alignment with Peking. Several non-Communist parties have been growing steadily, but none is large enough to provide a stable alternative to Congress Party rule at the national level.

Even with political stability under Nehru, the government had difficulty in keeping economic development abreast of population growth and in satisfying the demands of a politically awakening population. Indian economic growth is impressive in absolute terms; in relative (or per capita) terms it is low. This contrast is largely due to the country's late start toward industrialization, the rapid growth of the population (which increases by more than 12 million annually), the high rate of illiteracy, the religious, linguistic, and social complexity of the country, and the scarcity of equipment and of experienced administrative and technical personnel, all of which hamper the development of India's potentially large resources. Nevertheless, India is an important world source of minerals and 1 of the top 10 industrial nations of the world as well as 1 of the top 15 trading nations, though it is far behind the leaders in both categories.

The government has found it necessary to key its 5-year plan economic development targets to the growing needs of the Indian people rather than to the country's own capabilities, with the result that outside assistance is necessary to compensate for shortfalls. As each 5-year plan period passes, the increased size of India's industrial plant requires more foreign exchange, while its ability to produce exchange-earning export has risen very slowly. India, therefore, is dependent on increasing increments of foreign financial and technical aid in making net forward progress.

After achieving independence in 1947, India attempted to play a leading role among emerging nations by sponsoring a series of international conferences, establishing itself as a champion of anti-colonialist forces, and advocating a doctrine of non-alignment for Asian nations. Thus, during the mid-1950's, India was a leading participant in a loose and short-lived Afro-Asian bloc whose members worked together on a limited number of world issues.

Since then, and particularly since the death of Nehru, most Indian political leaders have become less interested in international matters not directly affecting India's welfare. They welcome close relations with both the West and the Soviet Union, which they view

\* Included with India in this NIS Area are the Indian union territories of the Andaman, Nicobar, and Laccadive Islands, the State of Jammu and Kashmir (whose status is in dispute with Pakistan), the protectorate of Sikkim, and the kingdom of Bhutan. Nepal is covered by NIS Area 35A.

as vital participants in Indian economic development and as potential guarantors against Chinese Communist aggression. Nevertheless, Indian diplomacy continues to attach some importance to Afro-Asian non-aligned causes, although at times Indian nonalignment appears to be little more than a lingering vestige of the Nehru era. Some government policies—such as the unwavering backing of the Arab countries—are designed in part to gain international support for India's position in its dispute with Pakistan.

India's relations with Pakistan, whose eastern and western provinces are separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory, have been strained since partition in 1947. Though both countries are members of the Commonwealth, they have been unable to reach agreement on a number of important points of difference, including conflicting claims in Jammu and Kashmir. In 1960, however, they managed to reach a satisfactory compromise on dividing the waters of the Indus River basin; however, a number of other issues remained unsettled. In early 1965 there were armed

clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces in a disputed portion of the Rann of Kutch, and in August and September of that year open warfare broke out between the two countries over the Kashmir problem.

Between 1947 and 1956 India held its military expenditures at a fairly constant level. After the delivery of substantial U.S. arms aid to Pakistan in 1956, however, India commenced a slow military buildup which was sharply increased following Chinese Communist attacks on Indian-claimed territory in the Himalayas in 1962. India, despite the government's political heritage of "nonviolence" and its conviction that world peace is necessary for India's economic development, maintains the largest military force in the free world after the United States, with approximately 1,144,500 men under arms in 1967. Indian military power strengthens the non-Communist world in a vital area close to Communist China, but it also contributes to Pakistani wariness of Indian intentions and thus heightens tensions between the two antagonistic subcontinental neighbors.

S E C R E T

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APPENDIX C

WEEKLY SUMMARY

27 June 1969

1. Table of Contents
2. Preface "Far East"
3. "Communist Guerrillas Active in Thailand"

S E C R E T

25X1

C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EDT, 26 June 1969)

Far East

	<u>Page</u>
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE	1
VIETNAM	2
The Communists' summer campaign remains confined to sporadic surges of offensive military activity. The Vietnamese Communists are taking a tougher line on the negotiations, especially regarding a role for the Saigon government.	
COMMUNISTS RENEW FIGHTING IN LAOS	7
Communist forces have launched a series of ground attacks against government positions near the Plaine des Jarres in north Laos.	
COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS ACTIVE IN THAILAND	9
Communist insurgents continue to make headway in the north while they try to improve their assets in the northeast.	

25X6

Europe

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE	11
FRANCE TO MODERNIZE ITS AIR FORCE FOR THE 1970s	13
The French Air Force is moving ahead with a modernization program to replace a major part of the force's equipment by the mid-1970s.	

SECRET

SECRET

- NEW GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER IN FRANCE 14  
 President Pompidou has put together a carefully balanced government that reflects both the continuity and the change he stressed during his electoral campaign.
- POLES INTERESTED IN WEST GERMAN TRADE 15  
 During the recent visits to Poland of West Berlin Mayor Schuetz and West German economic officials, the Poles exhibited a more relaxed political attitude toward Bonn, and demonstrated their interest in a significant expansion of commercial relations with West Germany, West Berlin, and the West in general.
- CZECHOSLOVAKS DRAFT NEW DOMESTIC POLICIES 17  
 Husak and his colleagues are drafting new measures that they hope will minimize the country's political and social ills.
- SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE BAATHISTS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA  
 Although the USSR has made a heavy investment in Syria and Iraq, both in terms of military equipment and economic aid, Moscow has not acquired much leverage over the policies of the two countries. (Published separately as Special Report No. 0376/69B)
- Middle East - Africa
- THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 19
- SOVIET ARMS RESUPPLY CONTINUES IN MIDDLE EAST 20  
 The USSR is maintaining the rate of military deliveries to its arms clients in the Middle East at close to last year's levels.
- BRITAIN SEVERS FINAL TIES WITH RHODESIA 21  
 As a result of the decisive mandate that the Smith government won in referenda held on 20 June, Britain this week announced the severance of all remaining formal ties with Rhodesia.
- MIDDLE EAST INCIDENTS INCREASE 23  
 The tempo of terrorist incidents and Israeli reprisals has risen over the past few weeks.

SECRET

POWER STRUGGLE ERUPTS IN SOUTHERN YEMEN 24  
President al-Shaabi's ouster on 22 June appears to represent a further shift to the left in Southern Yemen, but the position of the new government may not yet be secure.

INDIA AND THE HIMALAYAN KINGDOMS  
India considers the preservation of its predominant influence in the three Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim vital to the security of the Indian subcontinent. Its treaty relationships with each state provide for varying degrees of Indian involvement and each is heavily dependent on India for economic assistance, trade, and security. (Published separately as Special Report No. 0376/69A)

Western Hemisphere

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 25

SWEEPING LAND REFORMS ANNOUNCED IN PERU 26  
President Velasco has announced the promulgation of an agrarian reform law that provides for the expropriation and redistribution of all major land holdings in the country, including those owned by US companies.

COLOMBIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN GETTING UNDER WAY 27  
The reunification of the Conservative Party will strongly influence the choice of the National Front Coalition's presidential candidate for next year's election and reduces the chance of a split in the coalition that might enable ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla to win the presidency.

TURMOIL CONTINUES IN MEXICAN STATE OF YUCATAN 28  
Political conflict in the state of Yucatan is intensifying with the approach of the gubernatorial election in November.

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
FAR EAST

Hanoi, by rejecting any compromise arrangements short of a provisional coalition government, is trying to intensify pressures on the Thieu government. Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's top man in Paris publicly dismissed a suggestion that the Communists might join South Vietnamese Government representatives on an electoral commission. He also flatly ruled out international supervision of elections.

On the military side, the major Communist thrust during their sporadic summer campaign has been aimed at western Kontum Province, where South Vietnamese troops have recently assumed the major ground combat role. In particular, the Communists apparently are trying to impose a local defeat on South Vietnamese irregular forces at the isolated outpost of Ben Het in hopes of demoralizing the Saigon government and the armed forces. The enemy, despite substantial losses, has been repeatedly attacking the camp since early May.

Communist forces in Laos have launched a series of ground attacks against government positions near the Plaine des Jarres. The ability of North Vietnamese troops to move rapidly into position around Muong Soui demonstrates the vulnerability of the neutralist headquarters there to enemy forces situated directly east on the Plaine. It is also fresh evidence that the North Vietnamese can deploy troops into Xieng Khouang Province with little or no warning. The attack may have been intended as a response commensurate with the government's occupation for six weeks this spring of the once inviolate Communist base at Xieng Khouangville.

Communist insurgents are consolidating their control over tribal elements in north and north-central Thailand, while in the northeast they are trying to improve their assets. The guerrillas have continued to avoid armed encounters with superior government security forces, although periodic Thai operations have resulted in some small-unit clashes.



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## VIETNAM

The Communist summer campaign remains confined to sporadic surges of offensive military activity. The second June "high-point" materialized, for the most part, only to the northwest of Saigon. The enemy's two-day offensive thrust in Tay Ninh Province, which included a penetration into the provincial capital, cost the Communists more than 320 killed late last week.

At least one source has reported that slippage in the enemy's timetable was caused by allied pre-emptive operations. Nevertheless, current enemy activities strongly suggest that preparations for future offensives are under way. There have been reports that new attacks will come in July; some hint that a new surge of shellings and limited ground attacks is set for 2 July.

Meanwhile, Communist forces are maintaining pressure against the Ben Het Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp in western Kontum Province. Elements of three North Vietnamese regiments pose a substantial threat to the Ben Het - Dak To area. These units have been active throughout western Kontum Province for nearly two months. The camp and surrounding defensive positions have been the target of almost daily

artillery and mortar bombardments--totaling some 5,000 rounds--since early May. South Vietnamese patrols and reconnaissance forces have fought numerous engagements against enemy troops in the vicinity of the remote allied outpost.

Despite more than 300 B-52 sorties against enemy troop concentrations and bunker complexes since 1 May, testimony from prisoners captured near Ben Het points to further enemy action in the area. The Communists may believe a decisive victory over South Vietnamese troops who recently assumed the major ground combat role in Kontum Province would have considerable impact on the South Vietnamese Government and its army. Furthermore, if Ben Het should fall, it could be a major stepping stone for an enemy thrust against the South Vietnamese strongpoint at Dak To.

Despite the heavy losses suffered by the Communist 9th Division in its attacks on Tay Ninh on 18-19 June, defectors reveal that elements of the division continue to plan for coordinated attacks against allied targets in the province.

The extent of the continuing Communist effort in Tay Ninh suggests that this province plays an

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## COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS ACTIVE IN THAILAND

Communist insurgents continue to make headway in the north while they try to improve their assets in the northeast.

In the north and north-central provinces, the Communists are consolidating their control over tribal areas. Village propaganda meetings and sightings of larger insurgent bands attest to the insurgents' growing strength in Nan and Chiang Rai provinces. Village reports also indicate the guerrillas are strengthening their organization in Tak.

The guerrillas continue to harass government security forces, but incidents have become less frequent because several army units have been pulled out of the area for security duty in adjacent lowlands. Bangkok has assigned a new military commander to the north who has a reputation for being aggressive. Nevertheless, the leadership still appears to be divided on the best course to follow in combatting the tribal insurgency.

In the northeast, the guerrillas are apparently carrying out plans drawn up last December to pare down and improve their organization. An increased number of sightings of insurgents

in Udon Thani and Kalasin provinces indicate the guerrillas may be establishing footholds in neighboring areas that are relatively free of government security forces. They are reported to have established new political and military training facilities in Kalasin. Bangkok has been particularly concerned over the spread of insurgent activity in southern Ubon Province, an area that is especially vulnerable because of the proximity of Laos-based Communist forces.

The guerrillas also continue to avoid armed encounters with superior security forces, although periodic Thai Army operations have resulted in some small unit clashes.

There are some indications that the Communists intend to increase their military assets in the northeast. A senior Communist defector has stated that several hundred insurgents were scheduled to return earlier this year from extended training in North Vietnam and Laos. There have also been reports that the insurgents have acquired a few mortars and rocket launchers, but there has been no indication of their use.

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
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**Thailand: Insurgents Improve Positions in Widely Separated Areas**



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## COMMUNISTS RENEW FIGHTING IN LAOS

Communist forces have launched a series of ground attacks against government positions near the Plaine des Jarres in north Laos.

The action was highlighted by a sharp attack on 24 June against the neutralist headquarters at Muong Soui. At least two battalions of North Vietnamese troops supported by tanks overran a number of the base's outlying defense positions and inflicted light casualties on government defenders. The airstrip, however, remained in government hands.

One North Vietnamese prisoner claims that his unit moved into Laos from North Vietnam in early June with the specific purpose of attacking Muong Soui. The ability of the North Vietnamese to move their forces rapidly into position around Muong Soui demonstrates the vulnerability of the neutralist headquarters to enemy forces situated directly east on the Plaine. It also is fresh evidence that the North Vietnamese can deploy troops into Xieng Khouang Province with little warning or chance of detection.

In apparently related moves, the Communists drove government troops from Phou Soung, a recently won position north of the Plaine, and hit government guerrilla outposts on the southern rim. These actions are almost certainly in response to General Vang Pao's recent effort to re-establish a government presence on the Plaine.

The attack against Muong Soui is the first major action against that position in five years. It may have been intended as a commensurate response to the government's occupation for six weeks this spring of the once inviolate Communist base of Xieng Khouangville. The attack may also have been launched for political reasons. In recent weeks the Communists have made a concerted effort to portray Communist "patriotic neutralist" elements as the "true representatives" of the neutralist faction. Such pretensions presumably would be furthered by the capture of the neutralist headquarters at Muong Soui.

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APPENDIX D

WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT

18 April 1969



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APPENDIX E

MEMORANDUM

19 August 1969

CZECHOSLOVAKIA FACES THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE INVASION

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**Secret**



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

CZECHOSLOVAKIA FACES THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY  
OF THE INVASION

**Secret**

No. 1843/69  
19 August 1969

## WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
19 August 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Czechoslovakia Faces the First Anniversary  
of the Invasion

Introduction

The regime of Gustav Husak will meet its most critical test this week when Czechoslovakia marks the anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion of 20-21 August 1968. A tense situation exists. Dissidents appear determined to mount demonstrations, if only scattered and peaceful ones. An equally determined Husak has undertaken elaborate security precautions to control the situation. The measures ordered appear to be more than adequate, but some relatively minor incident could nevertheless spark civil unrest.

This memorandum proposes to collate available information on the current situation and assess the course demonstrations might take.

*Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research and the Office of National Estimates.*

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### Security Measures

1. Authorities have ordered the regular police reinforced with special units and have activated the people's militia--the Communist Party's security arm consisting largely of miners and factory workers. Some elements of the Czechoslovak Army are on alert, and the military probably will patrol all major cities throughout the week. Security officials are arresting known criminals, dissidents who have produced and disseminated inflammatory "antisocialist" leaflets, and others who are most likely to generate trouble. Border regulations have been tightened, primarily to restrict the flow of foreign students and journalists into the country during the anniversary period. The regime warned foreign newsmen in Prague against inflammatory reporting by expelling a Swiss correspondent on 15 August, allegedly for slandering Czechoslovak leaders.

2. Regime spokesmen and mass organizations are appealing daily to the people to refrain from even quiet, nonviolent demonstrations. Husak and President Svoboda reportedly will make additional televised appeals on 19 August. Svoboda, probably the most popular and respected political figure in the country, will follow with an "eleventh hour" plea for calm on 20 August--the eve of the anniversary. Other popular officials--such as Alexander Dubcek and Josef Smrkovsky--may be asked by Husak to urge the people to abstain from manifesting anti-Soviet sentiment.

### The Dissidents

3. Dissidents from labor, journalist, and student groups are active but are not calling for extreme violence. Leaflets circulating clandestinely throughout the country advocate peaceful demonstrations, including a boycott of public transport, restaurants, and nightclubs, and call for appropriate services to honor the victims of the "new terror." Handbills also call for a token five-minute general strike at noon on 21 August. The grave of student martyr Jan Palach, who set himself afire last January in protest over the occupation, was covered with flowers this past weekend. Top party leaders,

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who obviously would be thankful if nothing more than protests of this kind developed, nevertheless have assailed these methods of marking the anniversary.

4. Some labor groups have become increasingly bold. On 29 July Czechoslovak workers reportedly stoned a candidate member of the Soviet politburo when he tried to visit their plant. At another industrial installation, the Russian was greeted by a walkout. The rock-throwing episode was the most serious publicized incident since the hockey riots in late March that led to the ouster of Dubcek.

5. According to a recent poll, two thirds of the university students who are party members have no confidence in Husak's leadership. Student leaders are presently trying to persuade dissident youths to refrain from demonstrating, and university and government officials have agreed to postpone until September the remaining student examinations scheduled for the last two weeks of August in Prague. Nevertheless, some youths reportedly stole a few small arms recently, possibly intending to stir up trouble.

6. A continuing purge of the armed forces since the invasion probably has insured the reliability of the high echelons in the officer corps and the defense ministry. Most rank-and-file military personnel, however, are youths with a liberal political outlook who vehemently oppose the occupation. A shooting incident between Czechoslovak and Soviet soldiers is reliably reported to have taken place in Karlovy Vary on 11 July.

#### Hardliners a Source of Trouble

7. Pro-Russian officials in the regime who stand to gain from more doctrinaire policies--e.g., the editor of Rude Pravo--may attempt to fan any disturbances, hoping to bring the intervention of Soviet forces and the downfall of Husak and his moderate colleagues. These conservatives--probably confident of Soviet backing--have been critical of Husak for proceeding too slowly in re-creating a more orthodox Communist regime. They have been calling for arrests and trials of liberal and other

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anti-Soviet and anti-Communist dissidents, and for official party condemnations of Dubcek, Smrkovsky and others. This Husak has refused to do. Consequently, the hardliners may judge that the anniversary provides a good opportunity to weaken Husak's position and pave the way for his subsequent political demise.

8. Although their recent clandestine activities are unknown, the hardliners have the apparatus for subversive activity. They have established their own political "front" organization, organized student and journalists' unions, and now exercise control over some key security departments in the Interior Ministry.

#### Soviets Are Concerned

9. The Soviets have been taking an increasingly active hand in the situation as the anniversary approaches. Russian leaders Brezhnev and Podgorny met with Husak and President Svoboda in Warsaw on 23 July, and again in the Crimea between 2-10 August.

10. Moscow apparently has put pressure on Husak to whitewash the invasion by admitting publicly that it was a necessary move to save socialism in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia's main party daily, Rude Pravo, published on 29 July the first forthright justification for the intervention. That newspaper, however, is completely controlled by hardliners, and Moscow apparently is still insisting that Husak himself must declare that the intervention rescued the party from disintegration. Husak still has not succumbed to this demand, and, according to one source, he pledged last April that he would never do so.

11. The Soviets have also been in close touch with prominent Czechoslovak conservatives. Party secretary Indra arrived in the Soviet Union sometime before 2 August and departed for home on 16 August. Indra was on hand with Soviet leaders to greet Husak and Svoboda on their arrival in the Crimea and presumably took part in these talks as well as meeting with other Soviet officials. Another hardliner, Vasil Bilak, returned from Moscow to Prague on 18 August after discussions with Soviet party officials.

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Both Indra and Bilak talked with Soviet party secretary Katushev, a Brezhnev protégé who reportedly has been charged with monitoring the Czechoslovak situation. Both men are likely to confirm the Soviet inclination to demand repressive action as a means of forestalling disturbances.

12. A Soviet military delegation headed by General Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces, has been in Czechoslovakia since 6 August, conferring with party and government leaders and visiting military garrisons throughout the country. Yepishev and his staff probably are charged with overseeing security arrangements and contingency plans involving Soviet occupation troops and the Czechoslovak Army. The Soviet delegation may also be involved in efforts to strengthen the reliability of the Czechoslovak armed forces.

#### No Related Warsaw Pact Troop Activity

13. Reports that Soviet military units have recently entered the country have not been confirmed by reliable intelligence sources. Western military attachés in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have conducted several field trips during the past week, paying special attention to the major border crossing points, but have not observed any unusual activity. Neither is there evidence that Pact forces are preparing for combined maneuvers this week, as has been rumored. Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia may show themselves near the cities in the next few days, however, to add weight to the deterrents on popular outbursts.

#### Reaction in Eastern Europe

14. The reactions of the other invasion powers to the imminence of the first anniversary thus far have been minimal. The Poles--who have offered an open and direct endorsement of Husak--advertised their obvious concern over the situation by giving increased coverage and front-page treatment to Czechoslovakia on 15 August. Budapest media, however, have devoted only scant attention to Czechoslovak developments. The Hungarians, perhaps mindful of

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their own bloodbath in 1956, appear to be alarmed over the prospects for another Czechoslovak "crisis." A reliable source has indicated that Hungarian officials in Frankfurt and Cologne are not permitted to travel this week and must remain at their posts.

Likelihood of a New Crisis

15. The precautions taken and the ready availability of military force make an outbreak of violence of crisis proportions unlikely. Any disturbance that the Czechoslovak security apparatus could not handle would bring in Soviet troops, and would be short-lived. Moreover, the population-at-large does not seem primed to participate in any such insurrection. The people are increasingly apathetic toward politics and the Soviet occupation of their country. In addition, many who dislike the Husak regime nevertheless realize that open revolt would mean a change to a more Moscow-oriented leadership and possibly a new Stalinist age.

16. It seems likely that the security measures introduced by Husak are more than adequate to control the situation and to head off, if not discourage entirely, any large demonstrations. Most public protests--in the Czechoslovak tradition--probably will be confined to passive resistance such as the called-for boycott of public transport, restaurants and nightclubs, and a token five-minute general strike at noon on 21 August.

17. Small to medium crowds probably will gather at the graves of the victims of the intervention, and some groups may attempt to form a peaceful protest rally in Prague's Wenceclaus Square. The police probably have been instructed to disperse such gatherings as peaceably as possible.

18. Some incident such as a self-immolation or excessive police brutality might trigger isolated acts of violence, especially in areas where tensions are high. Disturbances could break out in such places as the industrial city of Ostrava, where worker unrest has been increasing. These might take the form of defiance of police orders to disperse or stoning the police and Soviet troop barracks and installations. Local authorities, however, probably

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can handle such outbursts without recourse to the people's militia or the army. Overreaction of security and police officials in minor confrontations with crowds also could precipitate a major incident, but this could also be controlled.

#### Husak After the Anniversary

19. During his first four months in office, Husak has been unable to get open and direct support from Moscow or a firm grasp on the powers he needs to run the party. Nevertheless, he has demonstrated that he is a strong leader who is both receptive to Soviet demands and able to avoid the "crisis politics" that gripped the Dubcek leadership in the aftermath of the invasion.

20. A resolute and uncompromising stand during the anniversary period, full and effective use of the security apparatus when and where required, and the passing of a relatively peaceful week--without major incidents--will strengthen Husak's hand vis-a-vis the Russians and give him some leeway within his own faction-ridden party as well. It will also enable him to focus on the country's myriad domestic problems, many of which are contributing substantially to the widening gulf between the party leadership and the people.

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APPENDIX F

SITUATION REPORT

- |  |              |
|--|--------------|
| 1. El Salvador-Honduras                        | 17 July 1969 |
| 2. Countries to be Visited<br>by the President | 31 July 1969 |

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OCI No. 0633/69

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
17 July 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

El Salvador-Honduras

(Situation Report Number 6 - As of 6:30 PM EDT)


1. Salvadoran response to the OAS cease fire proposal has not been received. The delay is believed to hinge on disagreement within the Salvadoran Government on the timing for withdrawal of troops. The OAS Organ of Consultation will meet again tonight at 9:30 PM EDT to continue its efforts to bring about a cease fire.

2. Honduran troops near El Amatillo on the southern front have encountered heavy mortar and artillery fire. A Honduran government official told our charge that three corsairs had been dispatched "to provide cover." The Embassy comments that the Honduran Air Force, riding the crest of yesterday's three confirmed kills on Salvadoran planes, are becoming "cocky" and anxious to redress recent losses on the ground. Honduran ammunition and other materiel is apparently still in short supply. The Honduran government has requested from the US on an urgent basis small arms, ammunition, and bombs through either commercial or military sales, and/or grants.

3. The Guatemala City press reports that Guatemalan refugees from both belligerent countries are flowing into the Guatemalan town of Esquipulas. The Guatemalan immigration service reports the numbers in the "hundreds" while the Red Cross says

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that "thousands" are entering the city. Meanwhile the US Embassy in Guatemala City reports that there is an increasing awareness among Guatemalan leaders of the long range damage the conflict is causing not only to the Central American Common Market but also to plans for the entire Central American integration movement.

4. OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza this morning told US Ambassador to the OAS, Jova that he would consider a variation on the OAS formula in an effort to gain an immediate cease fire. Galo Plaza suggested that both Honduras and El Salvador could tacitly agree to the principle of troop withdrawals but no deadline be set. Instead compliance would be within a "reasonable time." Ambassador Jova foresees considerable feeling in OAS against this proposal as going too far in "fuzzing" up nature of troop withdrawal. The majority believes that Article 7 of the Charter of the OAS is basic to the inter-American system and requires immediate cessation of the military occupation of Honduran soil.

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OCI No. 1745/69

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
1530 EDT 31 July 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Situation Report on Countries to be Visited by the President

No. 8


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
PAKISTAN

1. Rumors of a growing rift between Deputy Martial Law Administrator Air Marshal Nur Khan and President Yahya Khan continue to circulate.

2. Army Chief of Staff General Gul Hassan informed a close friend in mid-July that he had heard rumors from army officers that Nur Khan might lead a coup to overthrow Yahya Khan, 

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
 Hassan reported this to the president who stated that he was aware people were talking about a possible coup.

3. Since shortly after the establishment of the martial law administration on 25 March, there have been occasional reports that Nur Khan was dissatisfied with Yahya's leadership--particularly his failure to weed out corruption in government and his moves toward returning the government to civilian politicians. Nur apparently opposes an early return to civilian government. The air marshal is a dynamic officer and is generally regarded as having political ambitions. He has received more publicity in regard to his activities in his governmental role than either of the other two deputy martial law administrators.

4. Yahya, meanwhile, moving to assert his leadership, announced on 28 July a program leading to the eventual return of the country to civilian government. The plan has been welcomed by most West Pakistani political leaders and, presumably, will mute recent widespread demands for more action at the top. It is not yet clear, however, whether installation of the proposed civilian council of ministers will result in the return of Nur and the two other deputy martial law administrators to their respective services.

5. Unconfirmed rumors that Nur Khan is plotting a coup will probably continue and may reflect some "contingency planning" by the air marshal. To be successful in a coup, however, Nur would need widespread support within the ranks of the army officer corps, support which he probably could obtain only if Yahya, by his actions or inaction, appears to be destroying the public's confidence in the armed forces.

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6. President Yahya Khan reportedly plans to visit the Soviet Union in September. Since Premier Kosygin's visit to Pakistan late last May, Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union have slightly deteriorated. Rawalpindi has reacted coolly toward Soviet suggestions for regional economic cooperation and has rebuffed the Brezhnev proposal for an Asian collective security organization. Pakistan's controlled press has also been critical of the allegedly unhelpful Soviet position on Indo-Pakistani relations. Yahya may try to convince the Soviets that relations would be much better if only they would provide more military aid.

#### ROMANIA

1. The Romanian embassy in Moscow is urging all envoys to Moscow who are also accredited to Romania to come to Bucharest for the President's visit. According to a [REDACTED] embassy official in Moscow, Romanian diplomats are letting it be known that Bucharest not only wants a "good show" for the President, but also hopes to impress Moscow with a display of international support for the visit as a further means of emphasizing its independent course in foreign affairs.

2. Romanian diplomats posted elsewhere in Europe doubtlessly are making the same point. About 25 of the approximately 100 countries with which Romania has diplomatic ties do not have ministers or ambassadors resident in Bucharest. Of these, 12 represent African or Middle Eastern countries, 6 Asian, and the remainder are from other countries.

\* \* \* \* \*

3. A number of Soviet officials have spoken out recently on Soviet attitudes toward Romania in the light of President Nixon's forthcoming trip to Bucharest. Their remarks suggest a calculated effort to register their displeasure over the visit, but also indicate that the present inclination to treat the visit in low-key fashion will continue. On balance, Moscow's official silence and

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the caution of Soviet officials in private conversation over the past weeks have make it clear that Moscow does not intend to allow the President's trip to Romania to affect the course of US - Soviet relations.

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APPENDIX G

BRIEFING NOTES

23 May 1969

"CUBA"

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23 May 1969

DCI'S 27 MAY BRIEFING

CUBA

- I. It appears worthwhile to review the situation in Cuba, because Castro has been back in the news recently. There are new reports of new missiles in Cuba, new exile infiltration attempts, a new Castro policy on exporting revolution since the death of Che Guevara, and even new exile claims that Cuba is ripe for revolt if they just get a little help.
  - A. As a matter of fact, Fidel Castro is firmly in control of Cuba.
  - B. His power position is based on the loyalty of key officials in the military and security forces and in the Cuban Communist Party.
    1. Senior officers--most of them veterans of Castro's 26th of July Movement--comprise about two-thirds of the party's Central Committee, and dominate almost all other public institutions.

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2. They have become the supreme institutional force in Cuba, probably because they are the only organized group that Castro completely trusts.
- C. Despite his increased demands for harder work, austerity, and the unpopular reforms of 1968, Castro probably still has the support of a majority of the population.
  1. Juvenile delinquency has become a moderate problem for the police, but most youths and students appear to support the regime actively. More than half of the population is under 25 years of age.
  2. The peasants and activist members of the mass organizations probably are also loyal to Castro.
  3. Most other Cubans are acquiescent. They see no alternative to Castro, and fear the strong and efficient security apparatus. Many merely hope to subsist until they can emigrate legally to the U.S.

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D. Activities by Cuban exiles pose no threat to the stability of the Castro regime. In the past several years, the security forces have consistently proved themselves more than a match for groups attempting infiltrations and raids from abroad.

1. Ten members of a Miami-based exile organization landed in eastern Cuba early this month to conduct sabotage operations. Most were either killed or captured within hours after the landing; in less than six days, the entire team was wrapped up.
2. Another exile infiltration attempt last December met the same fate. All five team members were captured in less than a week.

II. The economic situation is still Castro's biggest headache.

- A. Troubles arising from mismanagement, inefficiency, low labor productivity, and shortages of workers for agriculture have been aggravated by a series of natural disasters.
- B. Output has increased slightly despite shortages of almost every kind since 1961, and considerable fluctuations in the economy.

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1. In 1967 Cuba's GNP was about 15 percent higher than in 1957 (the highest pre-revolution year). In that ten year period, however, there was a 20 percent increase in the Cuban population.

C. The outlook in the crucial area of sugar production, however, is not good.

1. This year's harvest, which was meant to be dress rehearsal for a planned 10-million ton crop in 1970, will not exceed last year's output of 5.2 million tons. One Cuban source admitted "unofficially" that the harvest would be only about 4.2 million tons.

2. The 1970 yield, moreover, will probably be no greater than 7.5 to 8 million tons. If it sinks below 7 million tons, Castro will be hard pressed to shrug off the complete failure of a goal he has pushed dramatically and unequivocally for the past four years.

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III. Castro's armed forces are in good shape. The Cuban military establishment is the most modern, the best trained, and best equipped in Latin America. It could successfully defend the island for any attack short of an invasion with U.S. support.

- A. The Cubans depend primarily on Soviet-supplied arms and equipment. From September 1966 to February 1968, an average of two major military shipments per month were received from the USSR, in a campaign to update and resupply the military services. There have been no major arms deliveries in the past 15 months, but the armed forces are at satisfactory levels of readiness and proficiency.
- B. It is unlikely that the USSR will attempt to reintroduce strategic missiles into Cuba.

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1. A good share of those rumors and reports of new missiles which we are able to check out trace back to the routine replacement of missiles for the SA-2 surface-to-air missile system.
2. This missile system has been operational in Cuba since mid-1962, and even in the Russian climate for which it was designed, the missile has a shelf-life of five years or less, after which it has to be replaced
3. It is commonplace, but still surprising and for intelligence purposes unfortunate, for untrained observers to be unable to distinguish between a 35-foot SA-2 missile, and a 75-foot SS-4 MRBM.

C. We do, of course, recognize that the Soviets have the technical capability to reintroduce the components of a strategic weapons system clandestinely.

1. Within the intelligence community, we have a CIA-DIA-State Team whose main purpose is to look into the missile problem. It also reports on the military posture in

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Cuba, particularly as it pertains to strategic weapons systems.


2. This team's latest report, dated 21 May 1969, states that "during the past month, there has been no evidence from photography or from other sources that there are any strategic missile systems or nuclear weapons in Cuba."
3. Intelligence analysts read and study every scrap of information received on the possibility of the presence or reintroduction of strategic weapons. They are in almost daily contact on this problem. Information comes from overhead photography, refugee interrogations, clandestine reports, and speculation by various press writers. After careful analysis, a coordinated report is printed each month by the team. The team is always "on-call" if any piece of information looks unusual.

IV. During the year and a half since the death of Che Guevara, Cuba has modified its tactics and priorities for "exporting" the revolution in Latin America.

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- A. Castro has withdrawn from the extreme and violent approach he pursued in 1966-67, has toned down Cuban propaganda, and has allowed front groups like the Latin American Solidarity Organization to lapse into dormancy. He has almost completely ignored themes of revolution during this period.
  - B. Castro is more cautious because of the repeated failures of guerrilla groups he has supported, and because he may realize that Cuban interference and bullying have contributed to their factionalism and impotence.
    - 1. He was stunned by the failure of Che Guevara in Bolivia, and in retrospect probably recognized the hopelessness of the campaign as it was revealed in Guevara's diary.
  - C. The Cuban intelligence service continues to train Latin Americans in guerrilla techniques, but more selectively than in the past.
    - 1. A few Cuban advisers are probably with insurgents in Guatemala and Venezuela, and Castro continues to support the principle of armed revolution as an instrument of his foreign policy.

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2. During the next year or so, however, he is likely to adhere to the more cautious approach he has followed since Guevara's death, unless he believes that some guerilla group is making definite headway.

V. Cuban relations with the USSR have improved considerably since last August, when Castro endorsed the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

A. In January 1969, Castro had warm and unequivocal praise for the first time in three years, even though massive Soviet economic support had continued without interruption in the interim. Relations between the two countries may now be better than at any time since Brezhnev and Kosygin came to power in Moscow.

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B. [ ] has reported that Castro has agreed to cease all public attacks on the Soviet-supported Communist parties in Latin America, and that the Cuban foreign intelligence service is working closely with the Soviet KGB.

C. Castro probably hopes that if he appears more compliant, Moscow will increase its aid to Cuba significantly. Larger numbers of Soviet

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technicians and advisers may be sent to Cuba, but rumors of increases in Soviet military personnel cannot be substantiated.

- D. Cuba's relations with Peking have been extremely cool since early 1966. They are not likely to improve appreciably in the near future, especially if Cuba attends the June meeting in Moscow of world Communist parties.

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